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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Aim and scope 
The present thesis is concerned with existential constructions in Middle English, focusing 
on the status of the morpheme there. The study is based on a corpus of 653 clauses from 
the works of Geoffrey Chaucer. The aim of the investigation is to describe the semantic 
and syntactic status of there. By taking a cognitive approach to the interpretation of the 
empirical results from the corpus, the study attempts to shed some new light on the nature 
of existential there. The main focus of this study is synchronic, but comparisons with 
Present-day English there will be made, thus adding a diachronic aspect. 
 
1.2 Background 
 
1.2.1 Existential there 
In Present-day English, there are two types of there1: The locative adverb there (there2) 
and the existential there (there1), exemplified in (1.1) and (1.2) below. 
 
(1.1) There is a bug in the software (there1). 
 
(1.2) Last summer I went to London. There I visited the Houses of Parliament (there2). 
 
The primary focus of the present thesis is there1, and the distinction between there1 and 
there2 is taken to be applicable to Middle English as well as Present-day English. As 
there is an extremely complex area of English grammar, an in-depth introduction is given 
in chapter 2 below.  
 The term traditionally used for structures like (1.1) is ‘existential sentence’ 
(Breivik 1983: 1). Although the structure in (1.1) corresponds to a simple sentence, there1 
may occur in both main clauses and subordinate clauses (Breivik 1983: 2). This is also 
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attested in the corpus used as a basis for this thesis. In the examples below for instance, 
there1 occurs in a simple main clause (1.3), in a subordinate relative clause acting as 
complement in a prepositional phrase (1.4) and in a coordinated main clause (1.5).  
 
(1.3) Ther nas no man nowher so vertous. (GP, 251) 
 
(1.4) ther is in Yorkshire [...] / A mersshy contree called Holdernesse, in which / Ther 
wente a lymytour aboute to preche, (SmT, 1709-1711) 
 
(1.5) His presse ycovered with a faldyng reed; / and al above ther lay a gay sautrie, 
(MilT, 3212-3213)  
 
For this reason the term ‘existential clause’ will be used rather than ‘existential sentence.’  
 The term ‘existential’ is often used to describe sentences containing existential 
there1, i.e. it used as a label for a syntactic class (Breivik 1983a: 3). However, there are 
several definitions of an existential sentence, some of which include there1 and some of 
which do not (for a full discussion, see Breivik 1983a: ff 3-7). Following Breivik, both 
syntactic and semantic criteria will be considered defining characteristics of an existential 
clause.  
In the present study, existential clauses are taken to represent the meaning of 
‘coming into existence’ or ‘being in existence’, in a fairly wide sense. However, the 
possibility of paraphrasing the expression with exist is not seen as essential, nor is the 
presence of there1 required for a clause to be considered existential. All the clauses in 
(1.6) – (1.9) (from Breivik (1983a: 4-5)) are thus considered to be existential: 
 
(1.6) There are two books on the table.  
 
(1.7) Two books are on the table. 
 
(1.8) There are lions in Africa. 
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(1.9) Lions exist in Africa. 
  
Breivik limits his definition to ‘clauses containing existential / locative be or an 
intransitive verb which has included in it the meaning “be in existence” or “come into 
existence”.’ For the purposes of the present investigation, certain other meanings are also 
included in the definition, as well as other verb types. 
 
(1.10) Ther made nevere womman moore wo than she (Tr. Book V, 1052) 
 
In (1.10), for instance, we have an example from Troilus and Criseyde of there1 co-
occurring with a transitive verb in the active voice, which is considered ungrammatical in 
Present-day English. Transitive verbs are only allowed in Present-day English existential 
clauses if they occur in the passive voice, and Breivik makes a distinction between 
passive there1 clauses and other existential constructions (1983a: 7). Quirk et al. (1985: 
1409), on the other hand, regard passive there1 constructions as being ‘special cases of be 
existentials.’ 
 In the present thesis, the term existential clause will be used in a broad sense to 
designate clauses containing a form of to be with the meaning of ‘being in existence’ 
(expressed through location in some kind of time and space), an intransitive verb with the 
meaning of being or coming into existence, or, finally, a transitive verb in the active or 
passive voice with a general meaning relating to presentation or existence. Such verbs 
include verbs of motion, inception and stance. This broad definition with an emphasis on 
the connection between semantics and syntax is a result of the cognitive framework of 
this thesis (see section 1.2.2 and chapter 3 below). Excluded from the present study are 
passive be clauses without there1 as the corpus would otherwise have become very 
extensive. Apart from this exception, all the above structures are included in the 
investigation, in order to get a better overview of the occurrence and non-occurrence of 
there1.  
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1.2.2 Cognitive Linguistics 
As this thesis takes the view that no meaning exists independently as such in a corpus of 
linguistic material, some kind of theoretical framework is needed in order to interpret the 
corpus data. In other words, although the linguistic units in the corpus are needed for the 
investigation, they only attain a ‘meaning’ when they are categorized, classified and 
interpreted in some way; i.e. assigned some kind of significance or meaning by someone. 
In the present study, a cognitive approach is taken to the interpretation of the results from 
the investigation of the corpus data.  
 The term ‘cognitive’ is often applied to a number of sciences. In addition to 
linguistics and psychology, Taylor (2002: 4) mentions e.g. ‘cognitive anthropology’ and 
‘cognitive archaeology’. Other examples of cognitive disciplines that have emerged so far 
are ‘cognitive sociology’ and ‘cognitive economics’ (Matlin 2005: 21). Cognitive 
sciences all have in common an interest in ‘the mind and its workings – such things as 
memory, learning, perception, attention, consciousness, reasoning, and what, for want of 
a better word, one can call simply, “thought”’ (Taylor 2002: 4).  
Based mostly on the theories of Lakoff and Langacker, the theoretical framework 
of the present thesis is ‘Cognitive Linguistics’ which is, broadly speaking, a view of 
language as symbolic and of linguistic capabilities as extensions of more general 
cognitive capabilities. The terminology in this study will follow Taylor, who 
differentiates between ‘Cognitive Linguistics’ with capital letters and ‘cognitive 
linguistics’ with small letters. The latter refers to any theory which claims that language 
resides in the mind in some way, while the former is committed to the view that language 
should be ‘embedded in what is known independently about human cognition’ (Taylor 
2002: 5). In other words, Cognitive Linguistics does not see language as some 
autonomous, special module in the human mind. Instead, language is regarded as an 
integrated part of cognition and understood in light of other cognitive capacities. This 
implies an assumption that language is something which is inextricably linked to the 
mind, as opposed to non-Cognitive Linguistics such as formalist or behaviorist 
approaches. Where the former tends to see language as formal system, a Grammar, which 
is ‘disembodied’ and ‘independent’ from its users, the latter views language as nothing 
but ‘observed behaviour’ (Taylor 2002: 6). Cognitive Linguistics, on the other hand, 
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seeks to study the conventional units of linguistics, such as syntax, morphology, 
phonology etc. and understand and explain these language structures in terms of  what is 
known about the mind independently of strictly linguistic behavior, paired with the 
communicative aspects of language (Taylor 2002: 9). This leads to a view of e.g. units of 
grammar and morphology as inherently meaningful, rather than semantically empty 
pieces to be filled into correct ‘slots’ in the grammatical system.  A more detailed 
introduction to Cognitive Linguistics is presented in chapter 3 below. 
 
1.3 The corpus 
As mentioned above (section 1.1), the present study is based on a corpus consisting of 
653 existential clauses of Middle English. All the clauses are taken from the works of 
Geoffrey Chaucer and both verse and prose are included. The prose texts are Boece, A 
Treatise on the Astrolabe, and The Tale of Melibee and The Parson’s Tale from The 
Canterbury Tales. The verse texts are Troilus and Criseyde and the rest of the The 
Canterbury Tales, all in all 405 pages.  
 The choice of Chaucer as the source for data is partly a matter of personal 
preference. As well as being a great author, Geoffrey Chaucer had a fascinating career 
and life (see section 1.3.1 below for further details), which brought him into contact with 
royalty, nobles, bureaucrats, merchants, lawyers, clerks and artisans. In addition to 
English, he spoke French, Italian and Latin, and he undertook translations into English of 
works from all three languages. He must obviously have had many sources on which to 
draw inspiration for his language. However, there is also a practical side to the matter. 
There can be no doubt that a more extensive examination of works by several Middle 
English authors would have provided a better foundation for making general claims about 
Middle English. However, as this is a master’s thesis, the scope must necessarily be 
limited to what can be achieved within two semesters, and in light of that I felt more 
comfortable with an in-depth investigation of one author than a superficial look at works 
by several authors. The following sections give a brief introduction to the life of Geoffrey 
Chaucer and the texts used as a basis for the corpus.  
 
 
6 
1.3.1 The author 
Geoffrey Chaucer was probably born in the early 1340s, as the son a wealthy wine 
merchant living in London. In his teens, he served in the household of the Countess of 
Ulster who was married to one of the sons of King Edward III. From 1360 to 1366 little 
is known about his activities, except for two pieces of information: He participated in 
King Edward’s campaign in France from 1359 to 1360 where he was captured and then 
ransomed with the aid of the king; and he was granted safe conduct through the kingdom 
of Navarre in 1366, perhaps on a mission for King Edward or possibly on a pilgrimage. 
In the same year Chaucer married Philippa, a member of the queen’s household; and the 
following year Chaucer himself became a member of the royal household, performing 
various duties ranging from military service, messenger service and diplomatic missions. 
During his time in the king’s service, he probably studied law at the Inns of Court, and it 
has been suggested (Crow and Leland 1987: xviii) that he started experimenting with 
various popular verse forms at this time.  
 From 1366 to 1370 Chaucer went on a number of missions to the continent for the 
king, but exactly where his journeys took him is uncertain. In this period he also 
produced his first major work, The Book of the Duchess. His first confirmed contact with 
Italy took place in 1373 when he was sent to Genoa and Florence, where he may have 
met, and hardly could have avoided hearing about, such authors as Petrarch and 
Boccaccio, as well as the recently deceased Dante. In 1374 Chaucer was appointed 
controller of the export tax (i.e. customs) on wool and sheepskins. This was an important 
(and lucrative) appointment as wool was England’s main export commodity and the 
customs were a major source of revenue for the monarchy. Chaucer evidently did a good 
job, as he kept his commission for twelve years, longer than anyone else at that time 
(Crow and Leland 1987: xx). During this period, which must have been very busy, 
Chaucer also somehow found time to write some of his major poems. He was also sent as 
an envoy to Italy and France again during this period, and it was from France that the first 
tributes to Chaucer as a poet came, from the leading French poet of the time, Eustache 
Deschamps. In one of his ballads, Deschamps referred to himself as ‘a nettle in Chaucer’s 
garden of poetry’ (Crow and Leland 1987: xxiii).    
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 In 1386 Chaucer’s service as a customs official came to an end, and he did not 
receive another major appointment until 1389 when he became Clerk of the king’s works 
and later deputy Forester in Somerset. 
 Little is known of Chaucer’s last years, but in December 1399 he leased a house 
near Westminster Abbey and for some time he collected royal payments that had been 
granted to him. The last payment to Geoffrey Chaucer was made on June 5 1400, and no 
records of him exist after this date. His tomb in Westminster Abbey pins down his date of 
death to October 25 1400, but since this tomb may have been erected as late as 1555; no 
reliable evidence exists as to the exact date of his death (Crow and Leland 1987: xxvi).  
 
1.3.2 Boece 
Boece is Chaucer’s translation, probably carried out between 1380 and 1387, of the 
famous work De consolatione philosophiae or The Consolation of Philosophy. This 
work, written by the late-Roman philosopher and politician Anicius Manilus Severinus 
Boethius (ca. 480-524 AD), was ‘immensely popular throughout the Middle Ages’ 
(Hollister 1994: 34). Written as a consoling dialogue between the imprisoned author and 
the female personification of philosophy, this work has been subsumed under the prose 
category, although some parts of the text lean more towards poetry.  
 
1.3.3 Troilus and Criseyde 
Written possibly sometime between 1380 and 1382, the story of Troilus and Criseyde is 
based on an Italian poem, Il Filostrato, by Giovanni Boccaccio. This poem, like 
Chaucer’s translation, is centered on the Trojan War. With the war as a background, the 
romance between Troilus and Criseyde is described in a way which is radically 
transformed from Boccaccio’s poem (Barney 1987: 472). Although he probably made use 
of both the Italian original and a very close French translation, Chaucer made the story 
distinctly his own, both in terms of structure, characters and tone.  
 
1.3.4 A Treatise on the Astrolabe  
This treatise is written to Chaucer’s son, Lewis, as a manual for using this elaborate 
instrument for measuring the position of stars and other celestial bodies. Although this is 
8 
a short, textbook-style piece, Chaucer’s clear and precise language, paired with a well-
planned structure, makes this a good example of his writing skills as well as displaying 
his diversity, through his knowledge of astronomy (Reidy 1987: 661).   
 
1.3.5 The Canterbury Tales 
Chaucer’s main work, The Canterbury Tales, was written over a long period of time. The 
earliest fragments may date from the period 1372-1380, while the latest may have been 
written as late as 1396-1400 (Benson 1987a: xxix). In fact, some of the individual tales 
probably existed before Chaucer came to the idea of using a pilgrimage as a narrative 
frame for a number of different stories (Benson 1987b: 3). Although no evidence exists to 
prove that Chaucer read the Decamaron by Boccaccio, he might have heard of it, and the 
resemblances are as obvious as are the differences. In both cases a narrative frame is 
constructed as an occasion for the characters to tell stories. However, while Boccaccio’s 
storytellers are presented as a homogenous group of young aristocrats, Chaucer’s 
collection of characters have little in common (to the extent that they argue and interrupt 
one another), all of them with their own distinct personalities. As a pilgrimage was one of 
the few occasions when people of very different backgrounds might meet in medieval 
society, a touch of realism is added, which is reinforced by Chaucer’s ‘ear for colloquial 
speech’ (Benson 1987b: 4). It is clear from the General Prologue that Chaucer intended 
the collection to be quite voluminous, but for unknown reasons only 24 tales were 
completed. Nevertheless, The Canterbury Tales are still considered one of the greatest 
works of literature of the Middle Ages (Hollister 1994: 361).    
 
1.4 Hypotheses 
As mentioned in section 1.2.1 above, there was a there1 / there2 distinction in Middle 
English.2 Moreover, it is often assumed that the relationship between Middle English 
there1 and Present-day English there1 was more or less as it is today. The aim of this 
thesis is to investigate this, and the following hypotheses are put forward: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A qualitative difference in terms of usage exists between Middle 
English there1 and Present-day English there1. 
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Hypothesis 2: Middle English there1 was more closely related to there2 than 
Present-day English there1 is. 
 
In other words, a significant change has taken place in terms of usage since Middle 
English. It is hypothesized that the reason for this change is that the cognitive relation 
between there1 and there2 has changed. As a result of this change, the semantic and 
syntactic affinities between there1 and there2 have been weakened.   
An attempt will be made to test these hypotheses through an investigation of the 
structure of existential clauses in Chaucer with particular emphasis on the verb phrase 
and the absence or presence of there1.    
 
1.5 Organization 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents previous research on there in 
Present-day English and Middle English, in addition to other topics related to the 
discussion on the development of there. Chapter 3 gives an outline of the theoretical 
framework and the methods used, as well as problems that had to be solved while 
working on the thesis. Chapter 4 presents the distributional characteristics of the 
existential clauses in the corpus. The main chapter of the thesis, chapter 5, discusses the 
findings in chapter 4 from the viewpoint of cognitive linguistics and seeks to understand 
Middle English there1 as part of a coherent category-system. Finally, chapter 6 
summarizes the most important results that have emerged from the investigation. 
 
                                                 
Notes 
 
1
 In the present thesis, the form there without a subscript number is used as an umbrella term for both there1 
and there2. 
 
2
 See also section 2.4 below. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a survey of some previous research on existential there as well as 
two additional concepts central to this work, grammaticalization and negation.  Much has 
been written in these fields and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to draw a complete 
picture of existing research. Here we shall look at some of the works that are most 
relevant to the present investigation.  
 Section 2.2 is concerned with the theoretical framework, whereas section 2.3 
gives an outline of some of the work on Present-day English there1. Section 2.4 contains 
a brief survey of the historical development of existential there, before sections 2.5 and 
2.6 turn to the topics of grammaticalization and negation, respectively.  
A full presentation of Cognitive Linguistics, and more specifically the works of 
Lakoff and Langacker which constitute the theoretical framework of this study, is for 
reasons of consistency given in chapter 3. However, Lakoff’s case study on there1 is 
introduced in the present chapter, as this study contrasts with other research and also 
serves as a preliminary introduction to the field of Cognitive Linguistics. 
 
2.2 On theoretical focus 
Although the theoretical framework of the present thesis is Cognitive Linguistics, a 
number of scholars who do not work within this tradition will be referred to. This slightly 
eclectic approach is based on the assumption that linguistic theories are not discrete 
entities, and that work from another theoretical tradition will only serve to enrich the 
present account. Thus, the ideas of Lakoff and Langacker (using both theories in fact 
constitutes a blending of theories in itself, as their ideas share common ground, but differ 
in certain respects, as shown in chapter 3), are employed alongside ideas from the 
generative tradition (represented by e.g. Pinker (1995) and Coopmans (1989)1). This does 
not entail a theoretical position which claims that all and any parts of the various theories 
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can be combined at will, but rather that a strict paradigmatic dogmatism is 
counterproductive when it excludes useful viewpoints, solely on the grounds that they 
belong to a different theoretical tradition. This does not, in my opinion, affect the overall 
framework of the thesis, since the results are interpreted along the lines of Cognitive 
Linguistics. 
  
2.3 There in Present-day English 
 
2.3.1 Locative vs. existential there 
As mentioned in section 1.2.1 above, Present-day English has two types of there, 
existential there (there1) and locative there (there2): 
 
(2.1) There are students in Bergen (there1). 
 
(2.2) The students are over there, hiding from the professor (there2). 
 
There2 functions as a fully-fledged locative adverb; it bears stress and is in deictic 
contrast with here (i.e. a contrast which depends on the context, like e.g. the position of 
the speaker relative to another entity; cf. Lakoff 1987: 468). There1, on the other hand, 
acts as a subject noun phrase in the clause and can behave like any other noun phrase 
with respect to syntactic operations like inversion and subject raising.2  
 Typically, there1 in Present-day English occurs with a form of the lexical verb to 
be or some other verb of existence, appearance or emergence (cf. Breivik 1997: 33). The 
prototypical occurrence of there1, referred to as ‘the central existential construction’ (cf. 
Lakoff 1987), is a clause beginning with there1 followed by a verb, a noun phrase and a 
final adverbial phrase, as in (2.1).  There1 cannot co-occur with locational verbs like sit, 
stand and lie in the central existential construction (Lakoff 1987: 544). The following 
clause is thus not permitted: 
 
(2.3) *There stood a student in the classroom. 
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Furthermore, there1 cannot occur with a transitive verb, takes no stress, does not 
contrast with here and has undergone phonological reduction, being usually pronounced 
/(r)/, while there2 is pronounced /´(r)/ (Breivik 1997: 41). There1 is often referred to 
as a semantically empty ‘dummy subject’ since it occupies the syntactic position of the 
subject in the clause (Breivik 1989: 32), seemingly without adding any meaning in itself.  
 
2.3.2 Bolinger 
The apparent meaninglessness of there1 is disputed by Bolinger, who claims that there1 is 
‘neither empty nor redundant, but is a fully functional word that contrasts with its 
absence’ (1977: 121). Bolinger emphasizes that semantics rather than syntax, seem to 
govern the use of there1, claiming that ‘”existential” there is an extension of locative 
there, with a meaning that refers to a generalized “location” in the same abstract way that 
the anaphoric it refers to a generalized “identity” in It was John who said that’ (Bolinger 
1977: 91-92). 
 Bolinger compares there1 to it, which is another morpheme generally considered 
to be void of semantic content and simply inserted for syntactic reasons. It is therefore 
relevant to take a brief look at his treatment of it, before returning to there1.  
 Looking at the two main uses of it, the ‘pronominal copy’ found in e.g. It is hard 
to say and the ‘weather’ use as in It is hot down here, Bolinger claims that in both cases 
‘it remains a pronoun whose meaning contrasts with its absence’ (1977: 66). It, according 
to Bolinger, always refers to someone or something that is already known or understood 
from prior context; and is ‘the pronominal neuter counterpart of the definite article’ 
(1977: 74). It is thus related to other nominals such as the fact: 
 
(2.4) Our interview brought it (brought the fact) into consciousness that we had a deep 
rapport. 
 (From Bolinger 1977: 75) 
 
It is, from Bolinger’s point of view, simply the most abstract among a number of 
nominals, and he hypothesizes that the reason for the apparent meaninglessness of the 
‘weather’ it, is that there is no need for further specification when referring to the weather 
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as this is understood from the context (1977: 79). Bolinger maintains that ‘if the two 
[forms of it] are not the same they are at least connected by a gradient too smooth for 
separation to be anything but arbitrary’ (1977: 82). It is thus seen by Bolinger as being 
definite while semantically being associated with general meaning,3 and he states that 
‘[our] mistake has been to confuse generality with lack of meaning’ (1977: 85). 
 The parallel between it and there1 is thus that they both refer to abstract and 
generalized meanings. This has, according to Bolinger, caused them to be wrongfully 
classified as semantically empty; and he also refers to Brown (1884: 666, in Bolinger 
1977: 92), who points out that ‘[the] noun place itself is just as loose and variable in its 
meaning as the adverb there; “There is never any difference”; i.e., “No difference ever 
takes place.”’ 
 As mentioned above, there1 is for Bolinger an extension of there2, i.e. basically a 
locative expression in terms of meaning (1977: 92). However, this is an abstract location, 
and the function of the so-called ‘existential’4 there1 is to bring ‘something into 
awareness’ (1977: 93). To illustrate the contrast between ‘presentative constructions’ 
with and without there1, Bolinger cites the following data:     
 
(2.5) a. Across the street is a grocery. 
b. Across the street there’s a grocery.  
  (From Bolinger 1977: 93) 
 
In (2.5a), something is presented on a physical scene immediately in front of us, whereas 
in (2.5b) something is presented to our mind or consciousness (Bolinger 1977: 94). Since 
(2.5a) refers to an entity which is immediately and physically in front of us, it can be 
accompanied by a pointing gesture, whereas (2.5b) cannot. As it would obviously be 
meaningless to point at something which is out of sight, there1 is used to help bring the 
entity in question into the hearer’s awareness. Or as Bolinger puts it: ‘The less vividly on 
stage an action is, the more necessary there becomes’ (1977: 96). In order to bring 
something into the awareness of the recipient of the information, a new entity can be 
related to ‘a concrete scene or to an abstract one (existence). Location and existence are 
the two extremes, but there is no dividing line between them’ (Bolinger, 1977: 99). In 
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other words: for something to exist it must have a location and vice versa. In the 
presentative constructions without there1, such as (2.5a), the stage is known and present 
in the narrative (being physically in front of us), it is ‘in a sense topicalized’ (Bollinger, 
1977: 110). However, in (2.5b), no stage has been set, and this is, in Bolinger’s view, 
precisely the function of there1: to set the stage and orient the hearer to it (1977: 114).  
 There differs from it, according to Bolinger, in the sense that whereas no sharp 
distinction between the abstract and concrete meanings of it can be drawn, there1 and 
there2 are clearly separated. Nevertheless, he maintains that although there1 has an 
abstract meaning, it is still ‘locative in the broadest sense of whatever in space and time 
can be seen as something “out there”’ (1977: 120).    
 
2.3.3 Breivik 
Breivik takes the view that the use of there1 in Present-day English is closely associated 
with the ‘topicalization principle’ which is a tendency for ‘elements containing given 
information (i.e. the topic) to come first in the sentence and for elements containing new 
information (i.e. the comment) to come near the end’ (Breivik 1989: 31). In the examples 
below, (2.6a) is thus very rare in Present-day English, while (2.6b) follows the 
topicalization principle. 
 
(2.6) a. An account book is on the table. 
b. There is an account book on the table. 
  (From Breivik 1989: 31)  
  
The ‘real’ or ‘logical’ subject (the account book) has, in other words, been moved to 
post-verbal position for reasons of communication; and the initial subject-slot in the 
clause structure has been filled by there1, which functions as a ‘dummy subject’ (Breivik 
1989: 32).  
 Furthermore, Breivik hypothesizes that there1 is obligatory in be-sentences which 
do not convey ‘visual impact’ (Breivik 1989: 32), as in these examples: 
 
(2.7) a. *No sign of life was in the house. 
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b. There was no sign of life in the house. 
  (From Breivik 1989: 32) 
 
If a sentence like (2.7a) is to be considered acceptable, it ‘must bring something – 
literally or figuratively – before our eyes’ (Breivik 1989: 33). In other words, there1 is not 
necessary when the sentence conveys visual impact as in (2.6a).5  
 Nevertheless, there1 does not carry any semantic information in itself according to 
Breivik; however, he suggests that it carries ‘a kind of information which we may call 
signal information: there1 functions as a signal to the addressee that he must be prepared 
to direct his attention towards an item of new information’ (Breivik 1989: 33). 
 In sentences with other verbs than to be, there1 can be regarded as a presentative 
signal too, but it is not obligatory in the same way: 
 
(2.8) a. Unicorns exist. 
b. There exist unicorns that are white in the winter, green in the spring, grey 
in the summer and black in the autumn. 
  (From Breivik 1989: 34) 
 
In (2.8a) the topicalization principle is violated and the sentence also fails to convey 
visual impact. However, this sentence follows the ‘heavier-element principle’ (Breivik 
1989: 34), which causes heavy elements to move to the end of the sentence. The subject 
in (2.8a) is simply not heavy enough to be moved to the post-verbal position, whereas in 
(2.8b) the subject is syntactically heavy and represents new information. 
 The non-be verbs that can co-occur with there1 are claimed to be verbs of 
‘”appearance or existence on the scene”, i.e. verbs like appear, emerge, exist and remain’ 
(Breivik 1989: 35). This is a result of the status of there1 as a presentative signal and 
explains why (2.9a) is acceptable and (2.9b) is not. 
 
(2.9) a. There appeared a man in front of us. 
b.  *There disappeared a man in front of us. 
  (From Breivik,1989: 35) 
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It also explains why there1 likewise cannot co-occur with a transitive verb in the active 
voice, as in e.g. (2.9), since break is not a verb of appearance or existence: 
 
(2.10) *There broke a girl a vase.  
 (From Breivik 1989: 35) 
 
The subsequent chapters will show that the conditions under which there1 could be used 
in Middle English differed to some degree from Present-day English usage. 
 
2.3.4 Lakoff 
Lakoff (1987) takes a holistic view of there, looking at both the locative and the 
existential there within a framework that has some similarities with Bolinger’s view. 
Working from a cognitive point of view, Lakoff claims that the ‘parameters of linguistic 
form in grammatical constructions are not independent of meaning; rather they are 
motivated, and in many cases even predicted, on the basis of meaning’ (Lakoff 1987: 
463). In other words, syntactic structures are not formal, mathematical systems without 
inherent meaning. Rather, they are a subset or specialization of our more general 
cognitive abilities; and they carry a semantic content. 
Lakoff’s starting point is the problems that the morpheme there poses for 
generative linguistics. According to Lakoff (1987: 557), generative linguistics cannot 
adequately account for the relationship between there1 and there2 by deriving existential 
clauses from expressions without there. Instead, Lakoff proposes an approach in terms of 
‘based-on,’ rather than ‘derived-from,’ relationships. This entails that although there1 and 
there2 display many similarities, they nevertheless form two distinct, but adjacent 
categories (Lakoff 1987: 556). There is in other words no generalized deictic or 
existential construction, with necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in each 
category. The reason for this is simply that a generalized construction would not have 
enough properties in common with the noncentral cases to formulate sufficient conditions 
that describe all the constructions. Thus, the membership in these categories is 
determined by necessary conditions which are generalizations based on a central, or 
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prototypical, category. These conditions can be extended via based-on relationships to 
noncentral category members, thus forming a radial category system. The radial category 
system is, according to Lakoff (1987: 537), to be expected ‘since such structures have the 
effect of maximizing motivation. Thus, radial structures in grammar have the same 
function that they do in the lexicon – that of reducing the arbitrariness of form-meaning 
correspondences.’ This function is achieved by the concept of motivation, where ‘central 
principles’ that define the central constructions do not necessarily apply to the noncentral 
category members, but they are nevertheless linked to the noncentral members via the 
based-on relationships, which Lakoff calls an ‘ecological location’ (1987: 464). These 
links can be defined by semantic and pragmatic relationships rooted in metaphors and 
metonymy, and distinguished by minimal differences from the central case. Thus, the 
notion of ecological structure is a way of describing a system where constructions ‘fit 
well’, i.e. are well motivated, by a correspondence between the meaning and form of 
constructions and the conceptual system (cf. chapter 3 below) they are based on. This 
will, with respect to e.g. there, make ‘minimal variations on it […] easy to learn, 
remember, and use’ (Lakoff 1987:538). 
The locative adverb there2, which there1 is based on, has a central category 
member, the central deictic, and ten noncentral category members. The central deictic 
uses here or there to point out entities and objects in a locative context relative to the 
speaker. The typical verbs in this construction are verbs of location, like be, sit and stand, 
or verbs of motion, like go, come, run or walk. The noncentral deictics are all motivated 
by and based on this central member. The following noncentral categories are posited by 
Lakoff (e.g. 1987: 580-581): The perceptual deictic, the discourse deictic, the existence 
deictic, the activity start deictic, the delivery deictic, the paragon deictic, the exasperation 
deictic, the enthusiastic beginning deictic, the narrative focus deictic and the 
presentational deictic. All these categories cannot be discussed in the present thesis; 
however, one is worth mentioning both as a general example and because it is referred to 
below. The existence deictic is based on the metaphor EXISTENCE IS LOCATION HERE; 
NONEXISTENCE IS LOCATION AWAY, and is found in expressions reporting birth and 
death like e.g. He’s gone, The baby has arrived and There goes our last hope (Lakoff 
1987: 518). This construction also shows that the deictics not only refer to physical 
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locations, but also to conceptual spaces concerning existence, which are ‘divided into two 
parts so that entities in locations near the speaker exist and those far from the speaker do 
not exist’ (Lakoff 1987: 519). This space is thus structured, or organized, in a way which 
is based on concrete locations. 
 Existential there1 on the other hand cannot, according to Lakoff (1987: 540), refer 
to specific, concrete locations. There1 can only refer to mental spaces and this is in 
Lakoff’s view (1987: 541) the source of all major differences between there1 and there2. 
However, he nevertheless proposes that there is a continuum between the deictics and the 
existentials. This is illustrated in that the concrete locations referred to by the central 
deictic, as in She’s over there, are further from the existentials than e.g. the space referred 
to by the existence deictic or the narrative focus deictic, as in There I was, in the middle 
of the forest. The space referred to by there1, on the other hand, is based on Fauconnier’s 
(1985, in Lakoff 1987: 281) concept of ‘mental spaces,’ involving ‘cognitive models that 
structure those spaces’ (Lakoff 1987: 281). This mental space is, according to Lakoff, ‘a 
medium for conceptualization and thought’ (1987: 281), which can represent both 
ongoing and fixed states of affairs. There1 can thus be seen to ‘designate a mental space 
in which a conceptual entity is to be located’ (Lakoff 1987: 542). This space is not a 
location, it is ‘a medium in which there are many locations,’ where the entities referred to 
are located. The central existential is defined by Lakoff as consisting of there1, be, a noun 
phrase designating a conceptual entity set up in the mental space by the indefinite article, 
and finally a final phrase which indicates the nature of the space, e.g. ‘a dream [or] a 
portion of the physical world’ (Lakoff 1987: 543). Thus, the mental space may, or may 
not, correspond to the ‘real’ world. The central existential is exemplified in (2.11a) and 
(2.11b). 
 
(2.11) a. In my dream there was a rabbit. 
 b. In the yard there was a rabbit. 
  (From Lakoff 1987: 543) 
 
Based on this, Lakoff makes the following predictions concerning there1 (1987: 544 ff): 
(1) there1 is not a locative adverb; (2) there1 does not contrast with here; (3) there1 does 
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not occur independently of existential constructions; (4) there1 does not bear stress; (5) 
there1  cannot be accompanied by a pointing gesture; (6) locational verbs like sit and 
stand cannot occur with there1; (7) there1 cannot point to a specific location since it 
designates a mental space, not a location; (8) there1 can take negatives and questions; (9) 
there1 can take full auxiliaries; (10) there1, like there2, functions to focus the hearer’s 
attention on the entity referred to by the noun phrase; (11) the noun phrase is not both 
definite and specific; (12) there1 is the first syntactic element, the final phrase is the last; 
(13) the verb precedes the noun phrase; (14) there1 is the subject; (15) there1 is unmarked 
and represents background; (16) the final phrase is optional; (17) the noun phrase is the 
subject of the final phase; (18) no verbs of motion are allowed. A number of these 
predictions will be further discussed in the following chapters. 
 Like the deictics, the existential category has a number of noncentral members. 
The most frequent of the noncentral existentials described by Lakoff found in the corpus 
compiled for this thesis is the presentational existential. It differs from the other 
existentials in that it allows a complex verb phrase, and the function of the construction is 
to bring an entity into a narrative, as in There once lived in Transylvania an old woman 
with three sons (Lakoff 1987: 570), or to set up a background, as in There were singing in 
the alley below a hearty group of carolers undaunted by the snow and cold. It also allows 
other verbs than the central existential (Lakoff 1987: 570 ff), as exemplified below in an 
example from the corpus data: 
 
(2.12) In which ther ran a rumbel in swongh, (KT: 1979) 
 
The other noncentral existentials are the strange existential, the ontological existential 
and the infinitival existential (Lakoff 1987: 581), of which only the last two were found 
in my material, exemplified in (2.13) and (2.14) respectively.  
 
(2.13) I / suppose that ther be prescience, (Bo, V. Pr. 4: 51-52) 
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(2.14) Forwhy ther ben some / thingis to betyden, of whiche the eendes, and the / 
bytydynges of hem ben absolute and quit of alle / necessite. (Bo, V. Pr. 4: 103-
106) 
 
The fact that the strange existential construction is not attested in the corpus does of 
course not mean that its existence in Middle English can be ruled out. 
 
2.4 The history of existential there1     
The historical development of there1 has not been studied quite as extensively as present-
day English there1; however, there is still a fair amount that has been published on the 
subject. This section is not an attempt to cover in detail every aspect of the discussion on 
the origin of there1; rather, it is intended to provide some background necessary for the 
study of the construction in Middle English.  
 Most scholars seem to agree that there1 has developed from there2 (see for 
instance Lakoff 1987: 470; Breivik 1997: 33). However, there is disagreement as to when 
this separation took place. According to Quirk (1951, in Breivik, forthcoming: 1), 
instances of there1 can be found in Beowulf, while other scholars, like Mitchell (1985: 
625, in Breivik, forthcoming: 2) disagree; arguing that the first unambiguous instances of 
there1 are found in Middle English. Breivik maintains that there1 and there2 were 
differentiated as early as in Old English and that already at this point there were 
similarities with Present-day English usage (Breivik 1989: 36). The following section is a 
brief summary of the historical development of there1, based mainly on Breivik (1989). 
 
2.4.1 The existence of there1 in Old English 
The existence of a there1 construction in Old English different from the deictic locative 
adverb there2 is supported by the fact that instances of there1 in Old English are used 
interchangeably both with ‘the classic dummy form it’ and a zero form (Breivik 1989: 
37). The use of an existential it in certain clauses, especially weather statements, was 
common in both Old English and Middle English; and is indeed still found in present-day 
English: 
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(2.15) It is raining.  
    
 
Here, it takes the role of grammatical subject, which would otherwise have been left 
empty by the lack of an agent. In this clause, it is traditionally simply considered to be a 
semantically empty slot-filler (but see section 2.3.2 above for Bolinger’s discussion of 
this subject). For instance, in the Lauderdale manuscript of Orosius we find clauses with 
there1 and clauses with the zero form or it in the corresponding Cotton manuscript 
version of the same text. This alternation is present in other Old and Middle English texts 
as well, e.g. the various manuscripts of Cursor Mundi. Line 2210 exhibits all three 
options: 
 
(2.16) a.  Þat tim it was bot a langage 
‘At that time there was only one language’ (Cotton MS). 
b.  Þat time was bot an langage (Fairfax MS). 
c.  Þat tyme was Þer but o langage (Trinity MS). 
(From Breivik 1989: 38) 
 
2.4.2 Old English word order  
The hypothesis presented by Breivik for the development of there1 is closely connected 
with changes in word order6 that took place from the Old English to the Middle English 
period. When classifying languages according to word order (i.e. the relative position of 
clause constituents like subject, verb, objects and adverbials), we subsume present-day 
English under the verb-medial category, which is also referred to as verb-third, SVX or 
XSV (Heggelund 2002: 1). This means that the subject will normally precede the verb in 
declarative main clauses, whether the subject is in clause initial position or not (thus 
making the finite verb the third constituent in those cases where the subject is preceded 
by e.g. an adverbial), as illustrated below: 
 
(2.17) a. Yesterday Jane bought a new motorbike. 
b. Jane bought a new motorbike yesterday. 
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Old English, on the other hand, was a verb-second language, or at least operated under 
some sort of verb-second constraint (Breivik, 1989: 40). In such a language7 the finite 
verb will be the second constituent in a declarative main clause, no matter which element 
comes first, as in (2.18):  
 
(2.18) *Yesterday bought Jane a new motorbike. 
 
It is, however, important to emphasize that this type of classification does not imply that 
the dominant word order pattern is the only pattern. Breivik (1989: 38) identifies three 
basic patterns in Old English, listed in a somewhat simplified form below: 
 
(2.19) SVO (the modern verb-medial pattern, where the subject precedes the verb) 
 
(2.20) S(…)V (where there is some other element intervening between subject and verb, 
usually found in subordinate clauses) 
 
(2.21) XVS (the verb-second pattern, where the verb is in second constituent postion) 
 
In Old English, XVS was the dominant word order pattern, but decreased in favor of 
SVO as the language gradually changed into a verb-medial language during the Middle 
English period. In the process of this change, there1- sentences ‘represent a compromise 
in the conflict between pragmatic and syntactic structure’ (Breivik 1989: 50). The initial 
position in the sentence is taken up by there1, acting as a ‘dummy subject’, thus fulfilling 
the requirements of the verb-medial syntax. This allows the logical subject to be moved 
into the post-verbal position, as was the case in the verb-second pattern. Additionally, it 
conforms to the topicalization principle. On this basis Breivik argues that there1 has 
developed the function of signaling new information through its use as a ‘dummy’ 
subject noun phrase: ‘Since this morpheme has come to be associated with the 
introduction of new information, it has itself acquired the status of presentative signal’ 
(Breivik 1989: 51). 
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 The circumstances under which there1 separated from there2 and developed this 
function can be seen as an early phase in a process of grammaticalization (Breivik 1997: 
41), a topic which will be dealt with separately in the following section. 
 
2.5 Subjectification in grammaticalization  
‘Subjectification’, according to Traugott, refers to ‘a pragmatic-semantic process 
whereby “meanings become increasingly based in the speaker’s subjective belief 
state/attitude towards the proposition”, in other words, towards what the speaker is 
talking about’ (Traugott 1995: 31). This is mostly a diachronic concept, and covers the 
development of semantic change in individual morphemes as a consequence of users 
assigning new meanings to those morphemes (Stein 1995: 130). As Traugott admits 
(1995: 31), this is a very broad definition. Stein (1995: 129-130) operates with five 
different notions of subjectivity and subjectification, the fourth of which corresponds to 
Traugott’s. It is this notion of subjectification which will be dealt with in this section.    
 ‘Subjectification in grammaticalization’ is the grammatically identifiable 
manifestation of this process, whereby the repeated use of a morpheme in a special 
context gives it an increasingly abstract and pragmatic function. ‘Grammaticalization’ is, 
according to Traugott’s definition, the process in which a lexical morpheme is reanalyzed 
through this special use as having a syntactic function (Traugott 1995: 32). As an 
example, Traugott uses the phrase be going to:  
 
(2.22) a. Mary is going to visit her agent.  
b. Mary is going to/gonna visit her agent. 
  (From Traugott, 1995: 31) 
 
In (2.22a), is going to is a motion verb in the progressive, i.e. Mary is at this very 
moment going or walking somewhere in order to visit her agent. In (2.22b), however, she 
intends to visit her agent sometime in the future, i.e. the issue here is the intention, and 
not the manner in which it will be carried out in the future. Going to/gonna has through 
repeated use developed a new meaning, which has led the hearers to reanalyze it 
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syntactically from a verb in the progressive to what Traugott refers to as a ‘quasi-
auxiliary’ (1995: 31).   
 The reason for this process, according to Traugott, is that as the speaker starts to 
use a more ‘reserved’ variant of a morpheme and the meaning is obvious for pragmatic 
reasons (i.e. from the context of the conversation), a ‘pragmatic strengthening’ takes 
place, allowing the hearer to ‘infer more than what is said’ (Traugott 1995: 49). 
Gradually, this may over time cause a morpheme to increasingly ‘serve pragmatic, 
interpersonal, speaker-based functions’ (Breivik 1997: 42); so that presented in the 
correct context the pragmatically strengthened form is unambiguous, while it continues to 
be potentially ambiguous when presented out of context.   
 Breivik hypothesizes that the development of there1 from there2 is an example of 
subjectification in grammaticalization (Breivik 1997: 41): The written form of both there1 
and there2 is identical, some of the original meaning has been lost (since there1 cannot 
refer to a concrete, physical location), there1 is syntactically reanalyzed as a subject noun 
phrase (as opposed to there2 which is an adverb of place) and finally, there1 has 
undergone a phonological reduction.8  
 
2.6 Negation 
Negation in Old English was expressed through the negative adverb ne, which could be 
strengthened with na or naht following or preceding ne to produce a more emphatic form. 
In Early Middle English, as this construction was used more frequently, it gradually lost 
its emphatic function until the common negator was the adverb ne followed by the finite 
verb and naht (Fischer 1992: 280). This ne ... naht pattern occurred virtually without 
exception in the Middle English period,  but gradually the phonologically weak element 
ne came to be dropped; and in late Middle English nat/noght/not was the common 
negator. However, Chaucer’s and other texts from the southeast and London still used ne 
... not and unsupported ne regularly. The latter was, according to Fischer (1992: 281), 
particularly common when ne was used as an auxiliary in one of its contracted forms like 
nys: 
 
(2.23) Ther nys no man that may reporten al. (SqT: 72) 
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Since the main concern of the present study is with existential constructions, 
negation will only be touched upon to the extent that it can shed light on the discussion of 
the main topic. Interestingly, Iyeiri notes that the use of negation (especially never and 
no) in existential clauses is so frequent that it ‘seems to be almost conventionalized’ 
(2001: 119). In his material, Iyeiri finds that never and no frequently occur in existential 
clauses irrespective of whether the clauses contain there1 (2001: 118). This feature is 
more common in verse than in prose, but the proportion of existential clauses containing 
a negator is often over 80% even in the prose texts (Iyeiri 2001: 120).  
In the following chapters no distinction will be made between the various 
negators no, never, ne, ne ... not and nys/nis/nas/nere. The crucial line will be drawn 
between those clauses containing a negator and those that do not. The main focus will be 
on how the negative existential clauses relate to the concept of NONEXISTENCE and how 
this contrasts with EXISTENCE. Horn divides NEGATION into REJECTION and DENIAL, 
with NONEXISTENCE as a subcategory of the latter (1989: 182-183), as in: 
 
(2.24) There isn’t any (more) soup 
 (From Horn 1989: 183) 
 
In (2.24), which is a negative existential clause, the proposition that there is any more 
soup left is denied. The term ‘denial’, however, does not necessary mean that someone 
has explicitly claimed that there is more soup left; ‘all that is required is that the positive 
proposition be somehow accessible as a good or natural guess’ (Horn 1989: 182).  
 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter has presented a survey of previous research on there1 in Old, Middle and 
Present-day English. In section 2.2 it was stated that the present thesis takes, within a 
cognitive framework, an eclectic approach to linguistic theory, while section 2.3 gave an 
account of research on there1 in Present-day English and established that there are good 
reasons to be suspicious of the claim that there1 is completely void of semantic meaning. 
Section 2.4 established the existence of there1 in Old English and traced its development 
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into Middle English, before section 2.5 presented a hypothesis for how the split between 
a locative there2 and an existential there1 could have taken place. Finally, section 2.6 
gave a brief presentation of negative constructions in Old and Middle English, followed 
by data from Iyeiri’s and Horn’s studies; stating that there is a connection between 
existential constructions and negatives in Middle English and Present-day English, 
respectively.  
  
 
                                                 
Notes 
 
1
 See chapters 3 and 5, respectively.  
 
2
 The exact classification of there1 appears to be, to a certain degree at least, a subject of controversy. 
However, for the purposes of the present thesis, existential there1 will simply be considered to have 
subject-noun phrase-like properties.  
 
3
 In Palestinian Arabic, the corresponding expression to English ’it is raining’ is ‘the world is raining’ 
(Givòn 1984: 90 in Smith 2002: 92). 
 
4
 Bolinger feels that the term ‘existential’ covers too much and claims that ‘the existential meaning is more 
a function of the verb than of there’ (Bolinger, 1977: 92). 
 
5
 According to Breivik, native speakers tend to find this example ’dubious, marginal or even unnatural’ 
when it is presented out of context. It is, however, considered natural under certain circumstances (see 
Breivik, 1989: 32-33). 
 
6
 What we look at is, in fact, not the order of words, but the order of syntactic elements or clause 
constituents. Thus, ‘constituent order’ would be a more precise term. However, for simplicity the term 
‘word order’ will be used throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
   
7
 E.g. Present-day Norwegian or German. (2.17a) thus exhibits verb-third order, while (2.17b) is an 
example of verb-second order, which is found in both verb-second and verb-third languages. 
 
8
 See section 2.3.1 above. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
METHOD AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The first part of the present chapter gives a general introduction to the theoretical 
framework, before exploring some of the more important themes in more depth. 
Furthermore, the implications of both the theoretical framework and the choice of 
material for the study are discussed. Of particular relevance are the notions of metaphors 
and prototype theory, as these concepts will be central in the discussion of the status of 
there1 in chapter 5. The second part deals with various problems which have been 
encountered, as well as the concrete techniques used for analyzing and interpreting the 
clauses in the corpus, including a description of how the program FileMaker Pro 5.5 has 
been employed for the purposes of this study.  
 
3.2 Cognitive Linguistics 
 
3.2.1 The cognitive aspects of Cognitive Linguistics  
 
3.2.1.1 Defining the field of study 
As mentioned in section 1.2.2 above, Cognitive Linguistics is just one of a number of 
different cognitive sciences. The common denominator for all of them is a focus on ‘the 
mind’, or more specifically, what goes on in the mind; viz. ‘the manipulation of internal 
representations of the external world’ (Matlin 2005: 21), i.e. what we can call ‘thoughts’. 
The problem with this is of course not only how to access these internal representations, 
but also how to access them in a way which is relevant for the field of study.1 
 An experimental approach is presented by Gibbs and Colston (1995). Working 
from a background in cognitive psychology, their research is nevertheless focused on 
Cognitive Linguistics and deals with the existence of ‘image schemas’. Image schemas 
are ‘patterns of [...] perceptual interactions’ (Gibbs and Colston 1995: 347) which direct 
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our everyday mental activities. When we think of the external, physical world in terms of 
e.g. a container, we express ourselves via metaphors (see section 3.2.3 below), and these 
metaphors rest, according to Gibbs and Colston, on ‘schematic structures’ like 
CONTAINER, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL and BALANCE (1995: 348). These image schemas 
emerge as a result of the way we ‘manipulate objects, orient ourselves spatially and 
temporally, and direct our perceptual focus for various purposes’ (1995: 347). In other 
words, our physical surroundings (and our own bodies’ interactions with them), have an 
impact on the way we form abstract metaphorical notions and express ourselves through 
language. Consider the following example: 
 
(3.1) I’m in Norway. 
 
When an area of land, such as a country, is viewed as a container (with a ‘boundary’, 
separating the ‘exterior’ from an ‘interior’ which can contain e.g. people inside it), this is 
achieved metaphorically through the preposition in based on an image schema which 
arises out of our knowledge of physical containers. Thus, this has implications both for 
semantics and the use of grammatical forms, like prepositions.2 Through a series of 
psycholinguistic experiments, Gibbs et al. 1994 (in Gibbs and Colston 1995: 352-354) 
found data that provides support for the hypothesis that the various meanings that people 
attribute to a polysemous word like stand3 are ‘partly motivated by image schemas that 
arise from their bodily experiences of standing’ (1995: 353).  
 The experiments conducted by Gibbs et al. support the theories that have evolved 
from a more introspective approach to language and the human mind, taken by e.g. 
Lakoff and Langacker. In both cases, the objectives are much the same, viz. to understand 
language in terms of general cognitive capabilities. The underlying assumption in 
Langacker’s work is that language is ‘inherently symbolic nature’ and that ‘[l]inguistic 
expressions symbolize, or stand for, conceptualizations’ (Taylor 2002: 20). Any linguistic 
expression is, according to this theory, composed of a phonological structure,4 a semantic 
structure and a direct, symbolic relation between the two. The ‘conventionalized 
association of a phonological structure with a semantic structure’ constitutes a ‘symbolic 
unit’ (Taylor 2002: 25). In slightly simplified terms, the symbolic unit symbolizes a 
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‘concept’, e.g. TREE (or an idea or emotion for that matter), which is an abstract, mental 
entity which resides in the mind of the individual language user (Taylor 2002: 42). 
However, Taylor points out that a concept is not a mental picture of a tree, but rather an 
abstract principle of categorization, which helps us to separate trees from other physical 
objects (2002: 43). Categorization is further discussed below, alongside other general 
cognitive capabilities. 
 
3.2.1.2 Some general cognitive capabilities 
Some selected aspects of Cognitive Linguistics that bear particular relevance to the 
present study are briefly introduced below. These are examples of general cognitive 
abilities which are also plausibly involved in language. A more detailed discussion of 
these topics is found in Taylor (2002: 9-16). 
 Categorization is, according to Taylor, a very basic ability possessed by all living 
creatures and one that humans in particular excel at (2002: 9). Whereas it for some 
creatures is sufficient to operate with categories like harmful and non-harmful and edible 
and non-edible, humans can take advantage of the ability to employ vast numbers of 
categories from the very narrow and specific to extremely general ones. Both physical 
objects and internal states like emotions are categorized. Examples of categories are 
concepts like trees, cars, fear and ideas. By categorizing social situations, processes and 
other people we can function in highly complex societies; and the categories are flexible 
allowing them to accommodate new experiences as well as different physical and cultural 
environments. In language, we categorize not only objects, ideas and various grammatical 
features like noun, verb, relative clause etc. Oral communication is the result of a 
division of different sound signals into categories, so that in English [ t ] and  
[ th ] are both categorized (and thus interpreted for communicative purposes) as / t /.5 The 
same holds true for written communication where signs on a background are categorized 
into symbolic representations of phonemes. Regardless of the choice of font type; or for 
that matter upper or lower case, the following combinations of black lines and curves 
against the white background are all categorized6 as the letter t, symbolizing the phoneme 
/ t /: T, ,  and ?. The concept of categories is further discussed in section 3.2.4 below. 
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 Figure-ground organization is based on visual perception, where certain parts of 
an image ‘stand out’ from the background. This is linked to attention and how we focus 
on a scene, e.g. when reading a page: The page of a book is perceived as a white 
background (ground) with black letters on it (figure) which stand out against the 
background. It is not likely that a page in a book is viewed as a black background with a 
very complex white pattern on it. However, it is not inconceivable, since the figure-
ground organization is quite flexible, which is illustrated in well-known ambiguous cases 
like the ‘vase-faces effect’ (Matlin 2005: 36). Such a picture can be viewed either as a 
white vase against a black background, or two black face profiles against a white 
background. To illustrate further how this organization is linked to attention, Taylor 
(2002: 10) points out that ‘we can have several levels of figure-ground organization. 
What is the ground at one level becomes the figure at another level.’ Although the letters 
on this page form a ‘primary figure’ against the white page, the whole page ‘constitutes a 
“secondary figure”, against the background of the wider visual scene’ (Taylor 2002: 10). 
Mental imagery and construal is another general cognitive ability which is 
relevant when studying linguistics. A specific scene or idea can be structured in different 
terms in order to mentally ‘construe’ the situation from different view points. A glass 
containing a certain amount of water can for instance be described in two distinct ways: 
 
(3.2) a. The glass is half empty. 
 b. The glass is half full. 
 
The same situation is described in (3.2a) and (3.3b), but the words chosen to encode each 
scene, structures it in a way which entails two different mental perspectives. 
Metaphors reflect our ability to think of something in terms of something else; 
and this is not limited to ‘fancy’ or literary language. Metaphors are seen as necessary to 
structure our thoughts, even in fairly prosaic sentences like (3.3): 
 
(3.3) We came to this conclusion. 
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Here, a mental activity (making a conclusion) is expressed as a physical location one can 
arrive at. Metaphors are further discussed in section 3.3 below. 
 The notion of conceptual archetypes, whether seen as preprogrammed into the 
mind or something that is learned, is an important area in language acquisition research. 
It also illustrates another cognitive aspect of Cognitive Linguistics, as it is possible to 
assume that the conceptual archetype thing, i.e. a ‘spatially bounded physical object 
which persists over time’ (Taylor 2002: 12), is what lies behind the syntactic category 
noun. In other words, conceptual archetypes express general (idealized) cognitive models 
which structure the language. As another example, Langacker (1999: 24-25) describes the 
conceptual archetype of the canonical event model as being composed of notions of 
(among others) ‘objects moving around in space and impacting other objects [and] two 
role archetypes, namely agent and patient.’ According to Langacker, there is a natural 
correlation between this model and the realization of a transitive finite clause with a 
subject (agent) interacting with (or having an impact on) an object (patient). Other such 
conceptual archetypes include for instance animacy and causality (Taylor 2002: 13). 
Through these idealized, general cognitive models based on ‘the physical realm of 
experience’ (Langacker 1999: 24), it is thus possible to assume that the motivation for a 
particular grammatical feature might be accessed; even in the case of a language with no 
native speakers. 
 However, paramount to all the features discussed above, Cognitive Linguistics 
views language as ‘inherently symbolic in nature’ (Taylor 2002: 16). Language is thus 
seen as an expression of the human capability of symbolic behavior.  All languages 
provide their users with a set of resources for representing thought, and Cognitive 
Linguistics is concerned with identifying and analyzing those resources, through a 
number of different approaches. This is reflected in all the cognitive aspects of Cognitive 
Linguistics discussed above. 
 
3.2.2 Cognitive grammar 
In addition to the general characteristics discussed above, some characteristics more 
specific to Langacker’s cognitive grammar deserve mentioning as they constitute an 
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important part of the foundations and assumptions which the discussion of there1 in the 
following chapters is based on. 
Cognitive grammar is, according to Langacker (1991b: 264), usage based. This 
entails that knowing a language means possessing knowledge of actual usage, 
conventions and exceptions which are not always particularly abstract, i.e. a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach with less emphasis on general rules. Language knowledge is dynamic in the 
sense that grammar is not seen as a device producing a specific ‘output.’ Rather, it is a 
system which ‘provides the speaker with an inventory of symbolic resources’ (Langacker 
1991b: 265) which the speaker can use in a new or canonical way according to the 
situation. Furthermore, cognitive grammar is surface oriented, in that it does not assume 
any underlying structures symbolizing the ‘real’ grammar, since ‘[c]ognitive grammar 
claims that grammatical structure is almost entirely overt. Surface grammatical form does 
not conceal a “truer”, deeper level of grammatical organization; rather, it itself embodies 
the conventional means a language employs for the structuring and symbolization of 
semantic content’ (Langacker 1991a: 46-47). 
Secondly, the study of semantics is important, because it is argued that the 
syntactic and morphological systems of a language are neither random nor 
preprogrammed universal rules, but motivated by their semantic aspects. Rather than 
describing lexical categories in terms of distribution, categories like noun and verb can be 
described through symbolic structures that illustrate their semantic motivation (Taylor 
2002: 29). An example of this would be the canonical event model as described in section 
3.2.1.2 above. 
Based on all this, cognitive grammar takes the view that a language cannot be 
reduced to a set of grammatical rules, but rather is understood as ‘a set of resources that 
are available to language users for the symbolization of thought, and for the 
communication of these symbolizations.’ (Taylor 2002: 30). This view is also adopted in 
the present thesis and constitutes an important basis for the argumentation regarding the 
status of there in Middle English. 
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3.2.3 A metaphorical approach 
Another branch of Cognitive Linguistics is focused on metaphor, and Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980: 4) argue that our conceptual system is metaphorical in nature and these 
metaphorical concepts (given in small capitals below) structure the way we act, think and 
talk about those concepts. A concept like ARGUMENT is e.g. expressed through the 
conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, and this structures the way we think and talk 
about arguments, leading to expressions like She won the argument and He attacked my 
argument. In short, ‘[t]he essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one 
thing in terms of another’ (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 5). We simply cannot avoid using 
metaphors in our daily lives when thinking and talking about these concepts and it is 
assumed in the present thesis that this was the case for Middle English as well. Of course, 
the conceptual system of Present-day English is bound to be somewhat different from 
that of Middle English. As an extension of the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor, expressions 
like He machine-gunned all my arguments to pieces and She ‘nuked’ her opponents 
would be acceptable in Present-day English, but are obviously unthinkable in Middle 
English.  
 Metaphorical concepts can be divided into many categories. For instance, Lakoff 
and Johnson differentiate between structural metaphors where one thing is understood in 
terms of another (e.g. ARGUMENT IS WAR) and orientational metaphors where one system 
is structured in relation to another (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 14). An example of the 
latter would be metaphors like HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN and CONSCIOUS IS UP; 
UNCONCIOUS IS DOWN. There are also other groups of metaphors mentioned by Lakoff 
and Johnson, but these two broad categories illustrate two main points relevant to the 
present discussion: 
 
(3.4)       a. Some of the metaphorical concepts are culture-specific. A hypothetical 
culture in which the concept of ARGUMENT is seen as a dance would argue 
and talk about arguments very differently from what is common in Europe 
and North America. In fact, it might not seem like an argument at all to 
someone accustomed to the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980: 5). 
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b. Some of the metaphorical concepts are based on physical experiences. For 
instance, the fact that we all have three-dimensional bodies influenced by 
gravity gives us the basis for structuring metaphorical concepts (and thus 
our existence) in terms of UP and DOWN. However, the choice of whether 
e.g. UP constitutes health or sickness is a matter of cultural variation. The 
physical experience simply provides us with the notions of UP and DOWN 
which are then applied to concepts in different ways.  
 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 17) state that the conceptual system is rooted in a combination 
of culturally and physically based metaphors, and that they constitute ‘a coherent system 
rather than a number of isolated random cases.’ Sometimes the distinction between the 
two is unclear because ‘the choice of one physical basis from among many possible ones 
has to do with cultural coherence’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 19). It is pointed out by 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 19-20) that the experiential basis of metaphors is something 
we do not know much about. Thus, rather than saying that MORE IS UP, a more complex 
approach where the two parts MORE/LESS and UP/DOWN were linked by a common 
experiential basis, could be adopted. However, this is avoided out of ‘ignorance’ (Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980: 19). As mentioned above (section 3.2.1.1), Gibbs and Colston (1995: 
347) present research that supports the existence of image schemas which provide an 
experiential basis for conceptual metaphors, nevertheless, the present thesis will continue 
to use the terminology employed by Lakoff and Johnson. In conceptual metaphors, the 
verb is will be used as ‘a shorthand for some set of experiences on which the metaphor is 
based and in terms of which we understand it’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 20). This 
applies both to the physical and the cultural base for metaphors. 
As these two bases for metaphors will be central in the discussion of there1 in 
chapter 5, it will be important to avoid any anachronistic interpretation or imposition of 
metaphors in the source material (see section 3.4.5.1 below). The central metaphorical 
concepts which will be dealt with in the present study are EXISTENCE, NONEXISTENCE 
and NEGATION, and how they relate to there1 and the notion of mental space (see section 
2.3.4 above). 
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3.2.4 Prototype theory 
Prototype theory, according to Lakoff (1987: 58), works (like Cognitive Linguistics in 
general does) on the assumption that language is based on ‘our general cognitive 
apparatus.’ If this assumption is correct, it would be natural to expect similarities between 
linguistic categories and other categories in our conceptual system. One of the expected 
similarities mentioned by Lakoff is prototype effects. These prototype effects reflect 
more general categorization mechanisms which help organize our linguistic resources. 
For instance: the morphological category ‘number’ has, according to Lakoff (1987: 59), 
‘marked’ and ‘unmarked’ members, singular and plural respectively. The singular, 
lacking a specific mark as in boy is unmarked, whereas the plural stands out as marked 
with its -s ending in boys. This difference between marked and unmarked is a prototype 
effect, with one member of the category being in some way more basic or prototypical 
than the other, with the unmarked member as the ‘default value’ (Lakoff 1987: 61). 
 Lakoff (1987: 79), points out that an important source of these prototype effects is 
metonymy, i.e. ‘a situation in which some subcategory or member or submodel is used 
(often for some limited and immediate purpose) to comprehend the category as a whole.’ 
An example of such a metonymic model is the category of mother. Lakoff lists a number 
of subcategories of mothers, such as working mothers, stepmothers, foster mothers, 
biological mothers, unwed mothers etc. (1987: 83). All these subcategories are variations 
on a central case, defined on cultural expectations of what a mother is supposed to be like 
or not be like. And the central case, which metonymically stands for all these noncentral 
cases, is the cultural stereotype of the married housewife-mother who gave birth to her 
children and raised them herself. Furthermore, as these noncentral cases are based on, or 
motivated by, stereotypes and normal expectations; they are not produced by the central 
case on the basis of a set of ‘necessary - and - sufficient conditions.’ Rather, they are a 
result of cognitive models which are adaptable to different cultural settings. For instance, 
Lakoff gives the example of traditional Japanese society, where it was common for a 
woman to give birth to a child which was then raised by her sister (1987. 84). No exact 
equivalent to this kind of mother exists among the categories of mothers in English. 
 The category mother is used by Lakoff as an example of a radial structure. This 
he defines as a structure where ‘there is a central case and conventionalized variations on 
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it which cannot be predicted by general rules.’ (1987: 84). Lakoff thus rules out 
categories that are generated by central cases plus general rules and also cases where the 
noncentral cases simply have additional properties (i.e. are specializations) but are 
otherwise similar to the central cases. 
 The present thesis will adopt Lakoff’s notion of a central subcategory with 
additional radial noncentral categories that are variants of this central category, as a basis 
for a discussion of the status of there1 in Middle English. The categories in question are 
not specialized instances of the central category, but rather deviations of it motivated by 
cultural conventions which must be learned one by one. These noncentral categories are 
thus ‘not understood purely on their own terms; they are comprehended via their 
relationship to the central model’ (Lakoff 1987: 91).  
 Although Lakoff’s research is based on modern languages and cognitive 
psychology, the human brain has probably changed so little over the last 600 years that it 
is not unreasonable to assume that the same cognitive mechanisms for category extension 
that exist today were at work in Middle English. This is an argument which also applies 
to the notion of conceptual archetypes (section 3.2.1.2 above). 
 
3.3 Analysis and methodology 
The analysis of the corpus material has been carried out through two distinct steps, a 
quantitative analysis followed by a qualitative one. For the quantitative analysis, the 
clauses in the corpus were entered into files in FileMaker Pro, version 5.5, and coded 
with respect to syntactic and semantic criteria. This includes word-order patterns, 
transitive/intransitive verb phrase, active/passive and other features. Also included were 
features like negation and the non-occurrence of there1 in existential clauses. See section 
3.5 below for a complete list of features. 
 For the qualitative analysis, the results from the quantitative analysis have been 
employed as a basis on which to apply the theoretical framework, viz. that of Cognitive 
Linguistics. This analysis has involved prototype theory, metaphors and other features of 
Cognitive Linguistics discussed above. 
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3.4 Problems of analysis 
 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Certain problems are particularly associated with the study of historical data. Since no 
native speakers of Middle English are alive, we must rely on written material and one 
problem is deciding how representative the texts are. When working from a cognitive 
perspective there is the additional problem of interpreting the texts, i.e. assigning a 
plausible meaning to signs written down over 600 years ago. On top of that, no original 
manuscript written by Chaucer himself survives. This means that all the copies which the 
modern editions are based on have been copied and probably altered by scribes and 
copyists. Also, the rules of punctuation and spelling were not as firmly set as today, 
which means that sentence analysis can sometimes be difficult, especially in the original 
manuscripts. 
 
3.4.2 Are the texts representative? 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the basis for this study is 653 existential 
clauses taken from the works of Chaucer, both verse and prose. Of course, since none of 
the surviving manuscripts containing Chaucer’s work were written by the author himself, 
there is no way we can be certain that the manuscripts in existence today accurately 
reflect Chaucer’s language. In fact, they probably differ to some degree, judging from the 
discrepancies between the various surviving manuscripts. These differences are most 
likely a result of different scribal practices as the manuscripts were copied in the decades 
following Chaucer’s death. However, the aim of this thesis is not to describe specifically 
the language of a man named Geoffrey Chaucer. Rather, the texts produced by him are 
taken as a representative basis which can be used to make generalizations and predictions 
concerning a specific dialect of Middle English in the decades before and after AD 1400. 
Therefore, it does not matter that certain aspects of the texts have been altered from the 
version produced by Chaucer’s own hand, as long as the alterations took place in the 
early 15th century and not the early 20th century. The language is still a sample of late 
Middle English as used in and around London. 
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 The same goes for the question of dialect features. Chaucer wrote in a London 
dialect based on or influenced by the East Midlands dialect, although he sometimes used 
other dialect features, most notably northern features, to create a stylistic effect. This 
means that studying Chaucer does not necessarily provide an insight into what ‘English’ 
at the time was like. However, in a sense, there were many ‘Englishes.’ There did not 
exist a notion of linguistic standardization comparable to Present-day Standard English. 
So even if several dialect samples from other authors had been included in the corpus 
material, no claim could have been made that the results were representative of Middle 
English in general unless all dialects were included and the results were valid for all of 
them. Such a survey of Middle English dialects might yield some interesting results in 
regard to how the dialects compare with each other; but that is still not the same as 
studying a standard dialect which is more officially sanctioned or representative than 
others. It was in fact Chaucer’s own, London-based dialect, which came closest to acting 
as such a standard at the time. A comprehensive survey of Middle English dialects falls 
outside the scope of this thesis, and the term ‘Middle English’ is here used as a 
convenient way of referring to the specific dialect used by Chaucer, unless it is explicitly 
stated otherwise. 
 Since this investigation is based on a modern edition of Chaucer’s works, it is 
important to bear in mind that this also constitutes an interpretation of the texts. However, 
apart from working with the original manuscripts, one can do little but trust the work of 
the editors of Houghton Mifflin and other publishers.  
 
3.4.3 Prose and verse 
Both verse and prose are represented in the texts which the corpus is based on, but it is 
assumed that this does not constitute a major dividing line in Chaucer’s language as far as 
the topic of existential constructions is concerned. Roscow (1981: 11) cites studies which 
have established ‘the bounds within which deviations were permitted, thereby providing 
evidence to refute any claim that that ME. writers, especially the poets, enjoyed a 
freedom of word-order amounting to licence.’ With a few exceptions, most notably some 
adjectival constructions, there are no major differences in word-order between Chaucer’s 
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verse and his prose according to Roscow. This is further discussed in chapter 4 in light of 
the corpus data which the present thesis is based on.  
However, even if the writers and poets at Chaucer’s time had enjoyed an 
extremely great freedom of choice in questions of grammar, it is hard to imagine a speech 
community without any notions of what constitutes a valid utterance. If a language is to 
function in its capacity of communicative tool, it needs certain rules (regarding both 
grammar and pragmatics) for that communication to be effective. The rules may differ, 
but they are most certainly present. We must therefore discard any notion that Middle 
English was ‘primitive’ and not effective from a communicative point of view. Middle 
English is simply a different language from Present-day English and both are languages 
of their times, suited for the communicative purposes of their times.7 These purposes are 
of course different and this may sometimes cause us to judge Middle English by the rules 
that have developed in Present-day English, which may lead to an unfortunate labeling of 
the former as being ‘illogical and undisciplined’ (Roscow,1981: 7). In fact, Spearing 
(1972: 47, in Roscow 1981: 7) proposes that ‘fourteenth-century English falls naturally 
into [...] physical conceptions of events’; i.e. what might in Present-day English be 
apprehended as abstract could be conceived of as more concrete in Middle English.  
As pointed out in section 3.2.3 above, Lakoff and Johnson propose that by using 
metaphors, we express something in terms of something else (1980: 5). As most of the 
examples of metaphors above show, an abstract proposition is often expressed in terms of 
something concrete. Sweetser points out that not only historical research, but also 
research on contemporary creoles as well as studies in children’s language development 
concerning the meaning of modals, show a tendency for abstract meaning to develop 
from concrete meaning (Sweetser 1990: 50). Section 2.5 above presented Traugott’s 
suggestion that the repeated use of a morpheme in a special context could give it an 
added, abstract meaning. Sweetser (1990: 49-75) uses this model to discuss how the 
English modal auxiliaries have evolved an abstract, or ‘epistemic,’ meaning, in addition 
to their concrete, or ‘root’ meaning8 (further discussed in chapter 4). Thus, without 
passing any qualitative judgments, it would seem reasonable to expect a tendency 
towards more concrete or physical meaning associated with certain Middle English 
morphemes that have since acquired and added, abstract meaning in Present-day English. 
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This highlights the flexibility in the human cognitive capability of mental imagery and 
construal (Taylor 2002: 11) discussed in section 3.2.1 above; that is, to structure events in 
different ways, as well as our ability to use metaphor in order to understand one entity in 
terms of another (cf. section 3.3 above). There is no reason to expect this general 
cognitive ability to limit itself to works of poetry only. 
Whether Chaucer’s poetry is seen as essentially different from his prose or not, it 
is hard to understand how he could have won such acclaim in his own lifetime if his 
audience had deemed his language to be ungrammatical. Chaucer’s success with a 
contemporary audience could perhaps be taken as support of a view of both his prose and 
his verse as representative samples of Middle English. Of course, the language in 
Chaucer’s texts is no accurate reflection of the spoken language. Being literary texts, they 
belong to a very different genre. However, at the time when Chaucer wrote, literature was 
written not to be read in solitary silence, but rather to be read out aloud (Benson 1987: 
xlvii, McDowall 1989: 64). For this reason, it is perhaps not unreasonable to assume that 
although the texts are examples of literature and not transcriptions of spoken language, 
they are nevertheless closer to the spoken language than a business contract or some other 
official or legal document. Crystal (1995: 38) points out that despite the fact that Chaucer 
uses a regular metrical structure, rhyme and other such features of poetry in much of his 
works, ‘[i]n no other author, indeed, is there better support for the view that there is an 
underlying correspondence between the natural rhythm of English poetry and that of 
English everyday conversation.’  
 
3.4.4 Introspection and intuition vs. empirical research 
This question is important because it determines not only the approach to the material 
examined in a very fundamental way, but also the choice of material itself. For instance, 
should the linguist use his or her ‘own’ vocabulary or rely on a corpus gathered from 
various native speakers? Should the linguist’s theories and conclusions be tested on a 
control group of native speakers or left to his or her own judgment? In a historical survey 
the answer to this question is given. Since no native speakers of Middle English are alive, 
no introspection is possible and the language can only be examined through corpora 
based on historical documents. And again it is important to keep in mind that this is in 
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fact, a separate language and not some unpolished, imperfect stage of a development 
destined to move ‘forwards’ to Present-day English. Languages, of course, move neither 
forwards nor backwards; they simply change as the native speakers of a given language 
gradually use it in different ways to express different concepts as their surroundings 
change in terms of cultural norms and technological innovations. The fact that there is 
some mutual intelligibility between Chaucer’s Middle English and Present-day English 
which enables us to read his texts with relative ease, should not make us forget that it is a 
separate language with no native speakers alive today.  
This poses a particular difficulty to those working with historical material from a 
cognitive point of view, namely how to decide what the native speaker(s) actually meant 
by the letters carefully written down in manuscripts hundreds of years ago. Lakoff (2004: 
COGLING e-mail list) points out the difficulty of assigning meaning to other people’s 
utterances, saying that ‘[s]ince you have a better idea of what you mean than you can 
have of what other people mean, your semantic introspection is more likely to be accurate 
when you are working on your own “corpus” than when you are working with other 
people’s utterances.’ When working with contemporary material, however, this can be at 
least partially offset by corroborating the findings with evaluations made by native 
speakers. This is of course not possible in historical studies. In any event there is 
nevertheless the inevitable interpretation by the linguist. As Lakoff puts it, ‘you need to 
interpret the data—to give it meaning. The meaning doesn’t occur in the corpus data. [...] 
There is no empirical research in cognitive linguistics without introspection. The idea that 
there is an empirical research / introspection contrast makes no sense at all in our field’ 
(2004: COGLING e-mail list).  
Suzie Bartsch, though agreeing with Lakoff that the linguist’s interpretation 
(based on a certain degree of introspection) is inescapable, proposes that we in fact have 
three interrelated continua, concerning introspection, empiricism and formality (2004: 
COGLING e-mail list). A given approach can have a high or a low degree of 
introspection; it can be more or less empirical in nature; and finally, more formal with an 
emphasis on abstractness or less formal with a more cognitive-functional perspective. 
Bartsch takes the position that a cognitive approach should rely primarily on empirical 
data coupled with (non-linguist) native speakers’ judgments, and less on introspection on 
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the part of the linguist. However, she disagrees with Lakoff by claiming that ‘meaning 
does occur in the corpus data and our task is to attempt to find it out’ (2004: COGLING 
e-mail list).  
The present thesis attempts to avoid both the positions proposed by Lakoff and 
Bartsch above. Thus, the corpus on which this study is based is not just seen as a source 
of utterances on which judgments of grammaticality may be passed, based on intuitive 
interpretations of semantic content. But neither is the ‘The Meaning’ seen as something 
existing ‘out there’ which can be ‘found’. Instead, it is attempted to take a middle 
position. Although the present thesis is based on the assumption that ‘meaning’ does not 
occur independently in a corpus material as such, it is nevertheless assumed that there are 
some conclusions which can be drawn from the corpus material. And even if the meaning 
of these results is in a sense constructed by the interpretations of the author, the results 
are still consequences of very specific tasks performed on the corpus data and those data 
must obviously be taken into account when formulating the conclusions to the 
investigation. When tests are performed on a corpus material, some features are tested 
and some are left out. This influences the results of the tests and thus the interpretations 
and conclusions which can be drawn from them. It is thus a bit simplistic to say that 
Cognitive Linguistics has no empirical research vs. introspection distinction. Both the 
choice of material and methods of dealing with that material will influence the linguist’s 
interpretations in some way. 
Thus, the question of empirical research versus introspection and intuition has 
some relevance to both how the material should be treated and the legitimacy of the 
conclusions based on it. In section 3.4.5 some possible ways of overcoming this problem 
are discussed.  
 
3.4.5 Some possible solutions 
The list of problems discussed above is not exhaustive, as only those considered to be 
most relevant to the discussion in the present thesis have been dealt with. Some of these 
problems are not easily solved, but that does not, in my opinion, mean that a cognitive 
perspective has no place in historical linguistics. It is, however, important to keep these 
problems in mind and try to minimize their effects. 
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 The present thesis is a cognitive study of corpus data and, as pointed out above 
(section 3.4.4), distributional characteristics of the corpus material will serve in a 
supporting role to an intuitive analysis. Following Bartsch’s proposal of three continua, 
this study can be described as empirical, in that the corpus consists of representations of 
utterances formulated in the late 14th century. Furthermore, it is cognitive-functional, as 
the focus is on how cognitive factors may have contributed to the evolution of meaning in 
the morpheme there. And finally, it involves a high degree of intuition and introspection 
on my part, since there are no native speakers on which to test the hypotheses presented. 
However, a native speaker would also have to rely on intuition and introspection. True, if 
enough native speakers agree that an utterance is grammatical, it probably is. And if 
enough native speakers agree on the classifications of the mental representations which 
an utterance is based on, the linguist is probably on the right track. Nevertheless, it is still 
a matter of introspection and intuitive thinking at some point. When working on historical 
material, there are obviously no native speakers around. Instead, certain distributional 
characteristics of the corpus data will, in combination with the theoretical apparatus of 
Cognitive Linguistics, in the present study serve as a basis for intuitive interpretations of 
the status of there in Middle English. 
 
3.4.5.1 The metaphors 
One of the foundations of this thesis is that some conceptual metaphors are so basic to 
human experience and cognition that they have not changed considerably over the past 
600 years, e.g. UNKNOWN IS UP AND KNOWN IS DOWN. This conceptual metaphor is 
presumably based on the fact that gravity makes it easier to examine something if it is on 
the ground than if it is flying through the air high above you (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 
20). It is not unreasonable to assume that a concept based on a force of nature like gravity 
was equally potent in the days of Chaucer as it is today. There is in fact evidence of 
metaphors in Chaucer resembling some of those that are operational in Present-day 
English: 
 
(3.5) What asketh men to have? / Now with his love, now in his colde grave /   
Allone, withouten any compaignye. (KT: 2778-2779) 
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In sentence (3.5), death (i.e. nonexistence) is presented as a solitary existence in a 
different place (the cold, lonely grave), making it a good example of the NONEXISTENCE 
IS LOCATION AWAY metaphor. This metaphor is also expressed in (3.6), where being 
dead is expressed as existing in a house (i.e. physical location) in another place: 
 
(3.6) His spirit changed hous and wente ther, / As I cam nevere, I can nat tellen wher. 
(KT: 2809-2810) 
 
(3.7) The coold of deeth, that hadde hym overcome, (KT: 2800) 
 
Example (3.7) expresses another metaphor which is also found in today’s language 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 15): HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP; SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE 
DOWN. In (3.7) the cold of death is construed as a personification which overcomes 
Arcite, i.e. is over or above him. 
 
(3.8) [Deeth] out of this world this kyng Alla he hente, (MLT, 1144) 
 
In sentence (3.8), the world (i.e. physical existence) is presented as a container which 
king Alla is taken out of, prompting us to see a land area (the world) as a container. This 
metaphor also exists in Present-day English (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 29). 
This is of course not meant as a claim that any conceptual metaphor in Present-
day English can be found in Middle English. I simply propose that some of the more 
basic (in the sense of dealing with existence, location and orientation) conceptual 
metaphors discussed in relation to existential constructions probably were a part of the 
English linguistic system in the 14th century.  
 
3.4.5.2 Frequencies of occurrence  
As mentioned above, the lack of native speakers of Middle English makes it impossible 
to test linguistic hypotheses concerning this language through interviews or experiments. 
However, based on the assumption that the boundary between grammatical and 
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ungrammatical statements is fuzzy, rather than sharp, a different approach may be 
employed to test the acceptability of the hypotheses presented.  
 By following Langacker (1987: 52) in assuming that there is no abrupt division 
between what is linguistically possible and what is not possible, a continuum from the 
clearly grammatical to the clearly ungrammatical is implicitly established. Furthermore, it 
is assumed that the frequency of a given construction is an indication of its degree of 
grammaticality; and that this continuum corresponds to one of prototypicality, where the 
most prototypical or central constructions will occur more often than the noncentral 
constructions. Pinker (1995: 113-114) points out that the fact that ‘[p]eople do not 
remember an arbitrary pairing (like a name with a face, or a treaty with a date) perfectly 
on a single exposure’ is ‘an uncontroversial principle in the psychology of memory.’ This 
is also true for grammar, and he gives the example (1995: 114) that if ‘children have 
heard held less often, their memory trace for it will be weaker, and retrieval less reliable,’ 
thus producing a non-standard form like holded. Adults make mistakes like this as well, 
though less frequently, especially with a rare form like the past tense of certain irregular 
verbs like shend, stride, cleave and geld (shent, strode, clove and gelt, respectively). The 
low frequency of these forms cause adults to make mistakes like shended and gelded, and 
Pinker refers to a study by Ullmann (1993 in Pinker 1995: 120) which found that ‘the 
more often the irregular version of one of these verbs is found in the written language, 
compared with the regular version, the better the irregular form sounded to people.’  
Pinker’s point is that repeated exposure triggers retrieval of the correct form of 
the verbs, which is not really what the investigation in the present thesis is concerned 
with. However, it is not irrelevant. As Lakoff points out in his case-study of there (1987: 
537), radial structures are employed in grammar as well as in the lexicon to minimize the 
‘arbitrariness of form-meaning correspondences.’ Presumably, if a grammatical 
construction or morpheme is well-motivated through a radial structure (i.e. is a central 
member of the radial category), the form-meaning relationship will be felt to be less 
arbitrary, thus making retrieval (i.e. use) easier. Lakoff (1987: 438) makes this claim, but 
qualifies it by pointing out that ‘[w]hat is being explained is not why those expressions 
mean what they mean, but why those are natural meanings for them to have.’ One could 
consequently assume that these forms would be used more often by the speakers since 
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they would feel more ‘right’ on the central/grammatical- noncentral/ungrammatical scale. 
This would seem like turning Pinker’s argument upside down, but all the irregular verbs 
listed above have very low frequencies of occurrence. Pinker refers to Bybee’s (in Pinker 
1995: 121) investigation of 33 irregular Old English verbs that also exist in Present-day 
English, of which 18 had become regular. Bybee found that the past tense forms of the 15 
verbs that still were irregular had a mean frequency of 137 pr million words (Pinker 
1995: 121). In other words, Pinker refers to noncentral members of the verb category, 
which are, possibly by virtue of being less well-motivated through a radial structure, 
noncentral and thus harder to learn, remember and use, which could be a contributing 
factor to a correspondingly low frequency of occurrence.  
A high frequency of occurrence in a corpus could thus be taken as an indication of 
‘cognitive entrenchment’ as the term is used by Langacker, caused by the prototypicality 
of the construction. Langacker (1987: 59) views cognitive entrenchment as a continuum, 
in which symbolic units (see section 3.2.1.1) are organized according to their degree of 
automatization, based on their frequency. This automatization, or ‘habit’, is the result of a 
process where a sound or segment acquires ‘unit status’, which means that it no longer 
needs to be constructed. Instead, the speaker is able to immediately access the entire unit 
without constructing it from its constituent parts (Langacker 1987: 57-58). Thus, a well-
motivated, prototypical form would presumably be very easy to learn and use and would 
as a result of this be expected to occur quite often. A noncentral form, on the other hand, 
would, as Pinker’s article suggests, take more effort both to learn and use and 
consequently occur less often in a corpus. However, a low frequency is not taken as a 
defining characteristic of a noncentral construction in itself. The distinction 
central/noncentral is based on to what degree the construction corresponds to the central, 
prototypical construction (i.e. syntactic criteria). By looking at the frequencies of 
occurrence, this study attempts to indicate the relationship between various noncentral 
constructions and the central construction. It is thus to be expected that a structure which 
is noncentral will occur less frequently. Thence, it is assumed that any noncentral 
category identified in the corpus material will reflect to what degree it is prototypical 
through its frequency. In other words, a given form or construction may be unusual in 
terms of grammatical acceptability, but that does not automatically mean that it will not 
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be used or occur in a corpus. It simply means that it might occur less frequently in a 
corpus material due to a relatively low degree of cognitive entrenchment.   
 
3.5 FileMaker categories 
The foundation for the theoretical discussion of the status of there1 in Middle English is 
the analysis carried out on the corpus data collected from Chaucer’s works. The 
categories in section 3.5.1 have been employed in FileMaker as a basis for categorizing 
the clauses in the corpus. This quantitative survey of various features provides the data to 
which the theoretical apparatus of Cognitive Linguistics is applied. See the appendix for 
an example of a FileMaker record.  
 
3.5.1 Word order patterns 
This section presents the different word order patterns and the criteria for assigning a 
clause to a given pattern. In the present thesis, the notation ‘S’ denotes the (logical) 
subject in cases where the subject is realized by a noun phrase (and not by there1) and 
occurs in front of the verb phrase. ‘T’ denotes there1 (regardless of the presence or 
absence of ‘S’), ‘V’ denotes the verbal element and ‘X’ represents one or more clause 
elements belonging to any other class. In order to keep the notation simple, not all 
possible variations are covered through the use of these three-letter descriptions, as 
illustrated by (3.10) and (3.12) below. 
 
3.5.1.1 STV 
Clauses belonging to the STV pattern have the logical subject in initial position followed 
by there1 and the predicator. This non-canonical structure thus has two elements that in 
Present-day English are mutually exclusive in initial position (viz. the formal subject 
there1 and the logical subject in the form of an indefinite noun phrase) preceding the 
verbal element. This is illustrated below in (3.9) and (3.10). Note that in (3.10) the verbal 
element is followed by two adverbials. 
 
(3.9) A KNYGHT ther was (GP: 43) 
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(3.10) Many fair shap and many fair visage/ 
Ther passeth thurgh his herte nyght by nyght, (MerT: 1580-81) 
 
3.5.1.2 SVT 
In the SVT pattern exemplified in (3.10) and (3.11) below, there1 follows the verbal 
element, but is otherwise similar to STV in that S and T do not occur in their canonical 
positions. 
Note that in (3.12) an adverbial element precedes the subject.  
 
(3.11) A MARCHANT was ther (GP: 270) 
 
(3.12) In al the parisshe wif ne was ther noon (GP: 449) 
 
3.5.1.3 TVX 
In TVX clauses, there1 functions as subject and this is the prototypical form of the 
existential clause as it is found in Present-day English, with there1 preceding the verbal 
element which is followed by a noun phrase. In Chaucer, the T element may be preceded 
by another element, typically some kind of prepositional phrase as seen in (3.13). 
  
(3.13) With hym ther was a Plowman (GP: 529) 
 
(3.14) Ther was also a reve (GP: 542) 
 
3.5.1.4 VTX 
The VTX pattern has the verbal element preceding there1 which functions as subject. The 
VTX pattern is thus similar to the TVX pattern, with the exception of the order of the 
syntactic elements. The VTX pattern usually has some other element (typically an 
adverbial) in clause initial position, as seen in the examples below. 
 
(3.15) In al the halle ne was ther spoken a word (SqT: 86) 
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(3.16) fro Berwyk into Ware / Ne was ther swich another pardoner. (GP: 692-693)  
 
3.5.1.5 Misc. 
This category comprises a number of structures that do not fit the patterns listed above. 
These are predominantly clauses where there1 is to be expected, but does not occur as in 
(3.17) or they are existential clauses that do not need there1 as in (3.18). 
 
(3.17) Was nevere wight, sith that this world bigan, (MkT: 2111) 
 
(3.18) I was atte dore of thyn herte (ParT: 288) 
  
3.5.2 The verb phrase 
When classifying existential clauses, the verb phrase9 is very important, as indicated by 
Lakoff’s predictions in section 2.3.4 above. The verb phrases have been classified on the 
basis of the following criteria: 
 
3.5.2.1 Transitive/intransitive 
The transitive/intransitive distinction is important, as Present-day English does not allow 
transitive verbs in the active voice (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3 above). 
 
3.5.2.2 Simple/complex  
As Lakoff points out (1987: 551, 570), the central existential construction does not take a 
complex verb phrase as its predicator in Present-day English. Consequently this feature 
has been included among the classification criteria. 
 
3.5.2.3 Active/passive voice 
In Present-day English, only the passive voice is allowed with transitive verbs in 
existential clauses (section 2.3 above), making the active/passive distinction a useful 
feature for examining the contrast between Present-day and Middle English. 
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3.5.2.4 Lexical verbs 
As mentioned above (section 2.3), the canonical verb in Present-day English existential 
clauses is be. The use of other verbs is rare and somewhat restricted (Lakoff 1987: 544 
ff). It is therefore interesting to explore which lexical verbs could occur in Middle 
English existential constructions. 
 
3.5.2.5 Auxiliary verbs 
In order to further explore the possible contrast between Lakoff’s predictions concerning 
Present-day English there1 and Middle English there1, the auxiliary verbs have also been 
included as a separate FileMaker category.  
 
3.5.3 Negation 
Iyeiri (2001) notes, as mentioned in section 2.6 above, that negation is a very common 
feature of Middle English existential constructions, and a separate Filemaker category 
was included for this feature. The criterion for subsuming a clause under this category is 
the presence of at least one of the negators such as ne, naht, no, noon, nevere, or one of 
the contracted forms nys, nis, nas. The semantic content of the clause is considered less 
important, as illustrated by the examples below. While the statement in (3.19) can be 
rephrased as He was busy,10 (3.20) is a ‘true’ negation in that the existence of all things in 
the town is denied. (See sections 2.6 above and 4.7 below for further discussion of this 
feature.)  
 
(3.19) Nowher so bisy a man as he ther nas (GP: 321) 
 
(3.20) The toun destroyed, ther was no thyng left. (KT: 2016) 
 
3.5.4 Other features 
A number of other features that also have been investigated are briefly mentioned below: 
 
 
3.5.4.1 Main/subordinate clause 
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The clauses in the corpus have been marked for whether they occur in a main clause or a 
subordinate clause. According to Breivik (1983a: 276), and-clauses in this period 
‘normally exhibit main clause order.’ Thus, and-clauses are, for the purposes of the 
present thesis, treated as main clauses and no distinction is made between simple and 
coordinated structures.  
 
3.5.4.2 Poetry/prose 
As mentioned above (section 3.4.3), the poetry/prose distinction is not expected to be of 
major significance. However, all clauses have been marked for whether the source 
material was a poetry or prose text, in order to test this statement. 
 
3.5.4.3 Absence of there1 
In section 3.5.1.5 above, it was pointed out that some existential clauses found in the 
corpus material, have a structure where the morpheme there1 is missing when it normally 
would be expected. Since Lakoff predicts that there1 normally is present in the central 
existential construction, this feature has been included as a category in FileMaker. 
 
3.5.4.4 Various comments 
A number of various other features were also included in the FileMaker classification-
categories. In addition to a present/past distinction (which I deemed as rather trivial after 
investigating the material11), various ad-hoc comments have been made in the textboxes 
in the FileMaker records. For this reason, there is not a complete 1:1 relationship between 
the categories used for analyzing the corpus in FileMaker and the topics discussed in 
chapters four and five.   
 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has been concerned with the theoretical framework of the thesis, the 
methods employed and methodological problems connected with the analysis. The first 
part of the chapter focused on the theoretical foundations of Cognitive Linguistics and 
their implications for the choice of methodology and material. The second part presented 
the specific ways in which the methodology has been employed. Included in this part was 
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also a discussion of various problems connected with the material, the chosen approach 
and attempts at solving them; as well as a description of the categories used for analyzing 
the material in the computer program FileMaker Pro 5.5.  
 
 
 
                                                 
Notes 
 
1
 A more comprehensive list of ‘cognitive sciences’ (but with an emphasis on those involving psychology) 
with additional information can be found in Matlin 2005: 13-21. 
 
2
 Lakoff (1987: 271-272) points out that we ’conceptualize an enormous number of activities in CONTAINER 
terms.’  
 
3
 Gibbs and Colston give various examples of a total of 35 different uses of stand, such as stand at 
attention, it stands to reason and don’t stand for such treatment (1995: 353).   
 
4
 ’Phonological’ is here to be understood in a wide sense, encompassing not only audible representations of 
language, but also e.g. writing and sign language (Taylor 2002: 21). 
 
5
 In Vietnamese, on the other hand, there is a phonemic difference. There is no inherent quality in these 
sounds which should cause them to be categorized as distinctive or not, and the classification is thus 
completely arbitrary from a phonological perspective (Haslev 1985: 57).  
 
6
 Several theories have been proposed as explanations for the actual process of visual object recognition by 
which we recognize and classify e.g. letters. Some of these theories are presented in Matlin (2005: 38-44). 
 
7
 George K. Zipf has summed up the general motivation for language change in the following manner: 
’Man talks in order to get something’ (Zipf 1949: 19 in Blank 1999: 63). 
 
8
 In modals, ‘root’ meaning is characterized as ‘permission’ or ‘ability’, as in John must be home by ten, 
whereas ‘epistemic’ meaning denotes ‘probability’ or ‘possibility’, as in John must be home already 
(Sweetser 1990: 49). 
 
9
 In the present thesis, the term ’verb phrase’ is used for all realizations of the verbal element in the clauses. 
Lakoff (1987) states that in the central existential construction, only a simple verb form may occur, 
whereas in some noncentral constructions a verb phrase may occur. However, following Quirk et al. (1985) 
all verbal elements in the present survey are seen as verb phrases, categorized either as a simple or a 
complex verb phrase. 
 
10
 This is what Iyeiri (2001: 116) labels ‘figurative negation.’ However, it still expresses the concept of 
NEGATION. 
 
11
 Bolinger (1977: 99) notes that ’[t]he simple tenses, past and present, virtually monopolize the field.’ In 
my corpus, 340 clauses were in the simple present, while 205 were in the simple past tense. This makes the 
total number of clauses in the simple present or past tense 545 (83.5%). Of the remaining clauses, a large 
number are in the present progressive, but as no indication was found that the choice of tense or aspect 
would significantly influence the conclusions of the investigation, the topic was not pursued further. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
DISTRIBUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF EXISTENTIAL CLAUSES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will present the corpus data and their distributional characteristics. The 
subsequent sections address the following main topics: Word order patterns, the verb 
phrase, the noun phrase, final phrases, the presence and absence of there1, negation and 
some additional minor features. The data presented in this chapter are the result of the 
analysis performed on the FileMaker categories posited in chapter 3, section 3.5 above.  
 
4.2 Word order patterns 
Describing existential clauses at the clause-level involves looking at the word order 
patterns that are attested in the corpus. As mentioned above (section 2.3.4), Lakoff (1987: 
544 ff) makes a number of predictions concerning the characteristics of Present-day 
English there1 and some of these predictions, numbers 12, 13 and 15, deal with the order 
of elements in an existential clause. According to Lakoff, there1 is the first syntactic 
element in a prototypical, or central, existential construction, while the noun phrase is the 
last; the verbal element precedes the noun phrase. It is therefore interesting to see 
whether Middle English allows other word order patterns in existential clauses than 
Present-day English does. 
 The word order patterns described in section 3.5.1 above are presented in terms of 
distributional characteristics in tables 4.1 and 4.2. This will give at least some indication 
of the order of clause elements in Middle English, although the word order in itself is not 
a marker of centrality or noncentrality as far as classification of existential clauses in the 
present thesis is concerned. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the distribution of word order patterns in Middle English 
existential clauses. 
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Table 4.1: Word order distribution in Middle English existential clauses 
Word order pattern N % 
STV 12 1.8 
SVT 18 2.7 
TVX 498 76.3 
VTX 84 12.9 
Misc. 41 6.3 
Total 653 100 
 
The summary in table 4.1 is broken down to allow for more details in table 4.2 below, 
where the word order patterns are marked for occurrence in main or subordinate clauses.1 
Additionally, the table shows whether the source material is a poetry or prose text. 
 
Table 4.2: Word order distribution in main and subordinate existential clauses 
Poetry Prose 
Main clause Sub clause Main clause Sub clause 
Word 
order 
pattern N % N % N % N % 
STV 10 1.5 2 0.3 - - - - 
SVT 13 2.0 5 0.7 - - - - 
TVX 154 23.6 185 28.3 90 13.8 69 10.6 
VTX 19 3.0 26 4.0 27 4.1 12 1.8 
Misc. 16 2.4 17 2.6 5 0.8 3 0.5 
Total 212 32.5 235 35.9 123 18.9 83 12.7 
 
It is evident from tables 4.1 and 4.2 that the STV and SVT patterns are quite infrequent 
and limited to poetry texts. It is possible that these patterns are variations that prevent the 
text from becoming monotonous when a high number of new characters are being 
introduced; that is, they function as some kind of literary device. Alternatively, since 
these patterns occur in poetry, metrical or rhythmical considerations might influence the 
word order, as proposed by Breivik (1983a: 351). These considerations would to a certain 
degree go hand in hand, and consequently neither possibility excludes the other. 
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Regarding the TVX, VTX and Misc. patterns, there is a difference in frequencies 
of occurrence between poetry and prose. This difference between poetry and prose in the 
distribution of word order patterns is statistically significant in regard to main clauses, but 
not subordinate clauses. In view of the low number of occurrences in some categories this 
difference should perhaps be regarded as a general rule of thumb. Nevertheless, this 
indicates that the main clauses in the poetry texts allow a greater variation in word order 
patterns than the prose main clauses do; that is, the differences in word order patterns in 
main clauses are greater than what would normally be expected. In other words, it would 
appear that the poetry/prose distinction does make a difference in the choice of clause 
pattern, which could be seen as qualifying Roscow’s (1981) statement (section 3.4.3 
above) that there were no major differences between Chaucer’s poetry and prose.2 This 
indicates that the relative position of there1 within the clause should be used with some 
caution in an argumentation regarding the status of this morpheme, at least as far as 
Middle English is concerned. Bolinger (1977: 112) states that ‘when there is introduced, 
only a literal locative can stand to the left of it as part of the presentative expression.’ For 
the most part, this does seem to be the case in the corpus material compiled for the 
present thesis, but there are exceptions, which (with the reservations stated above) could 
be seen as an indication that this was not an absolute rule in Middle English. However, 
the data are far from conclusive. 
The dominant pattern in both poetry and prose is the TVX pattern; that is, the 
same pattern as found in Present-day English with there1 acting as subject, followed by 
the verb and other clause constituents. However, more interesting for the present thesis is 
the comparison of the TVX and VTX patterns with Misc. The latter constructions show 
non-canonical behavior in terms of presence and absence of there1, and the comparison 
illustrates some of the functions attributed to Middle English there1. The constructions 
subsumed under these categories will be further discussed in sections 5.5.5 and 5.5.6 
below. 
 
 
 
 
56 
4.3 The verb phrase  
 
4.3.1 The importance of the verb phrase 
Moving down to the phrase level, the most important feature of existential clauses is the 
verb phrase, as is evident from the attention dedicated to this clause constituent in 
sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 above. Breivik states that there1 will not co-occur with a 
transitive verb in the active voice, and according to Lakoff existential clauses do not 
contain verbs of motion (prediction number 18) or location (prediction number 6). The 
prototypical verb found in existential clauses in Present-day English is be and this holds 
true for Middle English as well, as illustrated in table 4.4 below. However, table 4.3 
shows that transitive verbs in the active voice do occur, even if they are infrequent 
compared to the more canonical occurrence of be or some other intransitive verb.  
 
Table 4.3: Type of verb phrase in the active vs. passive voice 
Type of verb phrase N % 
Intransitive 563 86.2 
Transitive 59 9.0 
Linking verb 2 0.3 
Passive 29 4.5 
Total 653 100 
 
4.3.2 Intransitive verbs 
As mentioned above (section 2.3), the prototypical verb in existential clauses is to be, and 
although other intransitive verbs are allowed in Present-day English, they are very rare. 
However, in the corpus material which forms the basis for the present study, 192 
occurrences of non-be lexical verbs are attested, i.e. 29.4 % of the verbs in the corpus are 
a lexical verb other than be. In Present-day English this is usually a verb denoting 
appearance or existence (Breivik 1983a: 230). However, in Middle English such verbs as 
come, speke and wite are found in existential clauses which are otherwise similar to the 
prototypical form.  
 
57 
Table 4.4: Intransitive verbs: be vs. non-be verbs 
Main verb N % 
Be (simple VP) 433 77.0 
Be (complex VP) 19  3.3 
Non-be (simple VP) 85 15.1 
Non-be (complex VP) 26 4.6 
Total 563 100 
 
Below are examples of various existential clauses with intransitive verbs: A simple verb 
phrase with be as main verb (4.1); a complex verb phrase with be as main verb (4.2); a 
simple verb phrase with a non-be verb as main verb (4.3) and (4.4); and a  complex verb 
phrase with a non-be verb (4.5). 
  
(4.1) A KNYGHT ther was (GP: 43) 
 
(4.2) Yet nathelees/ Bitwixe yow ther moot be some tyme pees, (KT: 2474) 
 
(4.3) With hym ther rood a gentil pardoner (GP: 669) 
 
(4.4) or elles as manye / rychesses as ther schynen bryghte sterres in / hevene on the 
sterry nyghtes; (Bo, II. Metr. 2: 5-7) 
 
(4.5) Whilom ther was dwellynge at Oxenford a riche gnof, (MilT: 3187) 
 
4.3.3 Transitive verbs 
Breivik (1989: 35) points out that in Present-day English, there1 cannot occur with a 
transitive verb in the active voice since these verbs do not convey appearance or 
existence. However, as table 4.3 shows, this was possible in Middle English. Although 
the total percentage of transitive verbs in the active voice in the corpus is small (6.4 %), it 
is nevertheless interesting since this feature would not be found at all in a corpus based 
on Present-day English texts. 
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Table 4.5: Transitive verbs: Active (simple vs. complex) vs. passive voice 
Type of verb phrase N % 
Active voice, simple VP 32 36.4 
Active voice, complex VP 27 30.7 
Passive voice 29 32.9 
Total 88 100 
 
Below are examples of transitive verbs in the active voice (with two passive voice 
examples for comparison), from both Chaucer’s poetry and prose: 
 
(4.6) Ther wiste no wight that he was in dette (GP: 280) 
 
(4.7) ther maketh no man himselven riche, (Mel: 1582) 
 
(4.8) Ther kan no man in humblesse hym acquite (CIT: 936) 
 
(4.9) ther may no man taken vengeance on no wight but the the juge... (Mel: 1378) 
 
(4.10) That in hir coppe ther was no ferthyng sene (GP: 134) 
 
(4.11) yif ther were maked comparysoun of / the erthe to the gretenesse of hevene, (Bo, 
II. Pr.7: 28-29) 
 
(4.6), (4.8) and (4.10) are examples of a transitive verb in the active voice with a simple 
verb phrase, a complex verb phrase and the passive voice, respectively, taken from poetry 
texts. Sentences (4.7), (4.9) and (4.11) are examples of the same features, but taken from 
prose texts. This feature is further discussed in section 5.5.3 below.     
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4.3.4 Non-be verbs 
According to Lakoff’s prediction number 18, the main verb in the central existential 
construction is the verb to be. Other intransitive verbs may only appear in the noncentral 
presentational construction, and transitive verbs in the active voice, as pointed out above, 
cannot occur at all. However, a number of clauses in the corpus do not fit the predictions 
for the noncentral existential construction. These clauses are further discussed in the 
subsequent sections. In total, 199 (30.5%) of the existential clauses in the corpus contain 
a non-be verb3 (either as the only verb or as part of a complex verb phrase), with 91 
lexical items attested and a total of 201 occurrences of those items:  
    
Table 4.6: Frequencies of non-be verbs (simple and complex, active and passive, 
intransitive and transitive)  
Verb N % 
Come 19 9.4 
Dwelle 12 6.0 
Go 10 5.0 
Lakke 9 4.5 
Falle 8 4.0 
Stonde 7 3.5 
Make 6 3.0 
Nede 5 2.5 
5 < > 1 occurring verbs 70 34.8 
1 occurring verbs 55 27.3 
Total 201 100 
 
Below are examples of existential clauses with non-be verbs: 
 
(4.12) Til that ther cam a greet geaunt, (Thop: 807) 
 
(4.13) Whilom ther was dwellynge in my contree/ An erchedeken, (FrT: 1301) 
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(4.14) With hym ther wenten knyghtes many on; (KT: 2118) 
 
(4.15) Ther lakketh noght oonly but day and place (MerT: 1998) 
 
(4.16) For if ther fille tomorwe swich a cas, (KT: 2110) 
 
(4.17) Upon the which brook ther stant a melle; (RvT: 3923) 
 
(4.18) ther maketh no man himselven riche, (Mel: 1582) 
 
(4.19) Ther neden none ensamples of this; (ParT: 926) 
 
(4.20) That, save his wyf, ther wiste of it namo. (WBT: 957) 
 
(4.21) For hym ther wepeth bothe child and man; (KT: 2830) 
 
The following non-be verbs were found in the corpus material: 
 
Accorden, acquite, appeere, arace, asterte, availlen, bete, bigynne, bihoven, bityde, 
brynge, clepe, come, comprehend, convicte, cowche, cross, dare, dawe, defoulen, 
destourben, devyne, devyse, discryve, displese, do away, douten, dryven, dwelle, dye, 
embrace, enclose, escapen, establishe, expresse, fail, falle, follow, forge, fynde, gayn, go, 
gynne,4 have, help, hold, knele, lakke, leve, liken, lorn, love, lye, lyve, make, mortifie, 
nede, pass, perisse, ride, run, rysen, see, seme, serven, seye, shal,5 shyne, sitte, slaye, 
sowe, speke, spryngen, stand, stiken, suffer, swere, synke, take, tell, thenke, twynne, 
tyden, walken, wepe, will, wite, withholde, wonen, writen, wroughten. 
 
Only a few of the verbs listed above are found in Erdmann’s (1976 in Breivik 1983a: 
231) relatively extensive list of verbs that may occur with there1 in Present-day English. 
This does not necessarily mean that the rest of the verbs on Erdmann’s list cannot occur 
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in Middle English, they are simply not found in the corpus compiled for the present 
thesis. The following verbs are found in both surveys:  
 
Appear, begin, come, escape, follow, lack, live, pass, rise, shine and stand.  
 
A number of the verbs listed above, such as e.g. come, go, run, sit and stand are not 
supposed to occur in the central existential construction according to Lakoff. 
Nevertheless, Erdmann (1976 in Breivik 1983a: 231) includes both come and stand 
among the lexical verbs found in his Present-day English material. However, Lakoff 
points out that existential clauses like (4.22) and (4.23) below are allowed in Present-day 
English and Erdmann’s cases may be of these types, which are classified as noncentral by 
Lakoff, and more specifically as a presentational existential construction. 
 
(4.22) There will come a time when you’ll be sorry. 
 
(4.23) There ran into the room three strange men dressed as walruses. 
 (From Lakoff 1987: 551) 
 
The examples from Chaucer, on the other hand show a different behavior. In the 
following sections some special cases of non-be verbs will be dealt with. 
 
4.3.4.1 Movement verbs 
According to Lakoff (1987: 550) no verbs of motion are allowed since entities do not 
move through mental spaces. Thus the following examples are found to be ill-formed in 
Present-day English: 
 
(4.24) *There will go a boy to the ballgame. 
 
(4.25) *There can’t come any muggers in here. 
 (From Lakoff 1987: 550) 
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Lakoff proposes that these constructions, unlike those in (4.22)-(4.23), are not allowed 
since they do not convey appearance. It follows from this that the presentational 
constructions above cannot be negated (Lakoff 1987: 573). Although the positive 
statement in (4.23) above is allowed, the following is not: 
 
(4.26) *There did not run into the room three strange men dressed as walruses. 
 
Yet, in Chaucer, negation does occur as (4.27) exemplifies. 
 
(4.27) Ne noon so grey goos goth ther in the lake (WBP: 269) 
 
Below is another example of movement, with the verb come: 
 
(4.28) Doun fro the castel comth ther many a wight / To gauren on this ship and on 
Custance. (MLT: 911-912) 
 
Here, it is not a question of presentation or appearance, but rather a description of 
movement, as is evident from the second line, To gauren on this ship and on Custance; 
that is, the focus here is on the movement through space from the castle to the ship. 
 With the presentational existential, movement verbs that have the meaning of 
coming into existence, moving from one location to another or changing into a new state 
can, according to Lakoff, ‘fit more easily than others’ (1987: 572), as shown in the 
following example where a situation evolves into a new state: 
 
(4.29) There arose a commotion.  
 (From Lakoff 1987: 573) 
 
This use is also found in Chaucer: 
 
(4.30) Ther rose a contek and a gret envye; (Tr, V: 1479) 
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Here it is probably a question of changing into a new state, in a similar manner to (4.29). 
The example below, on the other hand, is more ambiguous. 
 
(4.31) Ther spryngen herbes grete and smale, (Thop: 760) 
 
This sentence could be interpreted as the herbs simply existing above ground level, in 
which case it is not in accordance with Lakoff’s predictions concerning this construction. 
Or the herbs could possibly be seen to spring up and out, thus moving from a state of 
‘unsprungness’ to one of being fully developed, which would allow it to fit Lakoff’s 
theory better. The next sentence, however, is obviously not dealing with either changing 
into a state, coming into existence or moving from one location to another. 
 
(4.32) Of which ther ryseth swich fumositee (PardT: 567) 
 
This sentence deals with motion, as it would make little sense to argue that the smoke is 
moving from one location to another. It simply moves, or rises, through space. These 
constructions are further discussed in section 5.5.2 below.  
 
4.3.4.2 Location verbs 
As Lakoff (1987: 544) points out, ‘[t]he basic-level locational verbs sit, stand, and lie 
cannot occur in the central existential construction.’ Just as was the case with motion 
verbs, verbs dealing with location ought to be restricted to situations dealing with 
physical space. Nonetheless, in Chaucer’s works, no less than 11 instances have been 
found of sit and stand. In the examples below, there is a certain presentational element, as 
in both cases an entity is being presented or located in relation to an adverbial of place. 
 
(4.33) A woolf ther stood bifron hym at his feet (KT: 2047) 
 
(4.34) Ther sat a faucon over hire heed ful hye, (SqT: 411) 
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As mentioned above, stand also occurs in Erdmann’s material of Present-day English, but 
presumably not in constructions subsumed under the term central existential in Lakoff’s 
model. Sit may occur in Present-day English as a part of the presentational existential, as 
exemplified below: 
 
(4.35) In the cubicle there was sitting alone a pretty young woman writing a term paper. 
 (From Lakoff 1987: 570) 
 
However, a sentence like (4.36) below is inconsistent with the presentational existential 
as described by Lakoff. 
 
(4.36) But ther sat oon, al list hire nought to teche, / That thoughte, ‘Best koud I yet ben 
his leche.’ (Tr, II: 1581-1582) 
 
Here, a new element is introduced, but no scene is described as in (4.35) above. 
Additionally, the information content of the noun phrase is very low (realized by the 
pronoun oon), and Lakoff predicts that the indefinite pronoun one will not occur here, as 
he considers the sentences below ungrammatical: 
 
(4.37) a. *There arose one. 
 b. *There ensued one. 
 c. *There entered one. 
  (From Lakoff 1987: 573) 
 
These constructions, which do not fit either the central existential or the presentational 
existential, are further discussed in section 5.5.1 below.   
 
4.3.4.3 Help/lack/need verbs 
According to Lakoff, any intransitive verb should be able to occur in the presentational 
existential, provided that ‘the verb phrase functions to set up an appropriate background 
for the noun phrase’ (Lakoff 1987: 572). Thus, with an intransitive verb like bleed, which 
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denotes a process rather than a background situation, the following sentence becomes 
ungrammatical: 
 
(4.38) *There bled a hemophiliac. 
 (From Lakoff 1987: 572) 
 
However, a number of constructions (18, to be specific) occur in Chaucer where the verb 
does not set up such a background as required by the presentational existential. These 
verbs are passive in meaning, but have been analyzed as transitive verbs in the active 
voice for the purposes of the present thesis. However, their passive meaning warrants a 
separate category. 
 
(4.39) Ther helpeth noght; al goth that ille weye. (KT: 3033) 
 
(4.40) Ther lakketh noght oonly but day and place (MerT: 1998) 
 
(4.41) Ther neden none ensamples of this; (ParT: 926) 
 
In these sentences there1 occurs with verbs that denote existence in some form, i.e. not 
involved in setting up a background. This topic is further discussed in section 5.5.4 
below. 
 
4.3.5 Linking verbs 
In the present thesis, the term linking verb is restricted to verbs that identify some kind of 
quality of the subject. Two instances of linking verbs have been included in the 
discussion of the verb phrase. 
 
(4.42) For he was yet in memorie and alyve, (KT: 2698) 
 
(4.43) she trowed that he was in maladye (MilT: 3416) 
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Although describing a quality of the subjects, being ‘alive’ and ‘ill’, respectively, the 
structure of these clauses makes it relevant to include them in the corpus. Metaphorically, 
the state of health or existence is here expressed as EXISTENCE in a LOCATION via a 
container metaphor, which could be taken as an indication of a close connection between 
EXISTENCE, LOCATION and POSSESSION. Since qualities (both permanent and temporary) 
are seen as being possessed by an entity (as in e.g. She has a bad temper and He has a 
serious disease), this could be interpreted as some kind of connection between these 
concepts, at least when the qualities involved are seen as relevant to the notion of 
EXISTENCE as in (4.42) and (4.43).   
 
4.3.6 Modal auxiliary verbs 
Lakoff makes no specific prediction concerning modals. To the extent that his noncentral 
cases have complex verb phrases, the examples usually contain one of the primary 
auxiliaries. However, he points out (1987: 520) that the presentational deictic (i.e. one of 
the noncentral there2 constructions, see section 2.3.4 above) can occur with ‘full 
auxiliaries’, which is relevant to the present discussion as it designates, either directly or 
indirectly, a location. Table 4.7 presents the modal auxiliaries found in the corpus.  
 
Table 4.7: Modals 
Modal N % 
May 31 46.2 
Shall 14 20.9 
Must 7 10.4 
Should 5 7.5 
Can 4 6.0 
Might 4 6.0 
Could 2 3.0 
Total 67 100 
 
The use of the modals is illustrated in the sentences below: 
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 (4.44) Ther may no man clepen it cowardye. (KT: 2730) 
 
(4.45) Honour is eek cleped greet lordshipe; ther shal no wight serven other, but of harm 
and torment. (ParT: 189) 
 
(4.46) And therfore ther moote been marchantz to bryngen fro that o contree to that 
oother hire marchandises. (ParT: 778)  
 
(4.47) That nevere sholde ther be defaute in here. (FranT: 779)  
 
(4.48) Ther kan no man in humblesse hym acquite (ClT: 936) 
 
(4.49) Ther myghte ben no fairer creature. (Tr, V: 808)  
 
(4.50) Ther koude no man brynge hym in arrerage (GP: 602) 
 
(4.46), (4.47) and (4.49) are examples of intransitive clauses, the rest are transitive. 
Although this is not proportionally in accordance with the frequencies of occurrence in 
the corpus data, it illustrates a general tendency for modals to occur with transitive verbs. 
Of the existential clauses with modals, 30 (44.8 %) occur with transitive verbs, the rest 
with intransitive verbs. When we consider that there are only 71 clauses in the corpus 
containing transitive verbs, while 580 contain intransitive verbs (10.9 % and 88.8 % 
respectively6), it would seem that the modals do tend to occur with transitive verbs to a 
higher degree than one would otherwise expect.7  
The semantics of the modals could possibly have an impact on the meaning of 
there1. Sweetser (1990: 50) argues that the epistemic, or abstract, meaning of modal verbs 
is motivated by their root, or concrete, meanings rather than being a separate, unrelated 
meaning. Whereas the former is often seen as involving ‘force or obligation’, the latter is 
often associated with logical possibility. By applying an analysis involving mapping from 
the physical to the epistemic domain, Sweetser attempts to show how the epistemic 
meaning is motivated by the root meaning through the semantics of force dynamics, more 
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specifically ‘forces’ and ‘barriers’ (Sweetser 1990: 51-52). She suggests that may and 
must are ‘the most clearly force dynamic modals’ (1990: 52). The corpus data show that 
may is the most frequent modal in existential clauses, and it is interesting to speculate if 
the reason for this could be a metaphorical connection between the locativeness (or 
concreteness) of certain there1 constructions and the force dynamic nature of may. 
According to Sweetser (1990: 74), the extension of modal root meanings to abstract 
mental spaces, allow the root meanings to motivate the epistemic meanings of the 
morphemes. This is certainly parallel to the relationship between there1 and there2, but 
whether the application of forces and barriers to a mental space can be seen as evidence 
of locativeness is uncertain. However tempting it is to project Sweetser’s analysis of 
modals in terms of physical and sociophysical forces and barriers onto a more concrete or 
locative interpretation of the mental space designated by there1; more research than what 
is possible within the scope of the present thesis is needed before any substantial claims 
can be made on this topic. 
 
4.4 The noun phrase 
In prediction number 11, Lakoff (1987: 545) states that no noun phrases with a definite 
article can occur in the central existential construction, simply because ‘[t]he function of 
the construction is to focus the hearer’s awareness on the referent of the construction.’ In 
other words, if the construction is to function as an awareness device, then it must direct 
the awareness at something which the hearer was not previously aware of. The following 
sentence is thus not permitted in Present-day English: 
 
(4.51)  *There wasn’t the man in the room. 
 (From Lakoff 1987: 545) 
 
However, the definite article is allowed if the noun phrase is not specific (Lakoff 1987: 
546), as in the example below.  
 
(4.52) There was the usual argument in class today. 
 (From Lakoff 1987: 546) 
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In Chaucer, three examples of existential clauses with definite noun phrases have been 
found, of which one is of the same type as (4.52) above, while at least two of the others 
have a noun phrase which is both definite and specific. Consider e.g. the following: 
 
(4.53) But certes, to the harmes that I have, / ther bytideth yit this encrees of harm, that 
the gessynge... (Bo,I. Pr. 4: 281-282) 
 
Bolinger (1977: 102) notes that even in Present-day English a definite noun phrase is 
possible with ‘an appropriate setting which can be described by the action,’ which is 
close to Lakoff’s description of the presentational existential (1987:570). As mentioned 
in section 2.3.4 above, the presentational existential functions to bring a new entity into a 
narrative, and it is possible that the definite noun phrase in (4.53) is some sort of 
anaphoric the, i.e. a literary device used to create what Bolinger (1977: 111) calls ‘a kind 
of artificial continuity.’ (4.53) could thus be seen as an instance of the presentational 
existential.  
 
4.5 Final phrases 
Lakoff points out (1987: 549) that existential constructions have ‘final phrases’, optional 
elements which broadly correspond to the meanings of ‘location,’ ‘manner’ and 
‘comparison.’ These elements can be realized by prepositional phrases, non-finite clauses 
or adjective phrases. However, some final phrases are not allowed in the central 
existential construction in Present-day English. Adjectives describing a quality of the 
noun phrase are problematic, as illustrated below.  
 
(4.54) *There is a man tall. 
 (From Lakoff 1987: 550) 
 
In Chaucer, we find the following examples of this construction in Middle English: 
 
(4.55) ne ther nys no man siker / that sche ne hath nat forsake. (Bo, II. Pr. 1: 72-73) 
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(4.56) And, deere sire, for as muchel as ther is no man certein if he be worthy that God 
yeve hym victorie or naught, (Mel: 1663) 
 
However, this could be a question of inherent vs. noninherent qualities, as tall is an 
inherent, or permanent, quality in a person, while certain is temporary and determined by 
the situation. In the following clauses, on the other hand, a temporary interpretation 
seems unlikely: 
 
(4.57) Ther is no man kan deemen, by any fey, (SmT: 2236) 
 
(4.58) Ther nys no man so wys that koude thenche, (MilT: 3253) 
 
These sentences contain adjectives describing inherent or permanent qualities, since 
‘being able to judge’ and ‘being wise’ must be considered relatively permanent states, at 
least once they have been reached or acquired. Milsark (1979: 211) refers to these two 
types of adjectives as ‘property’ and ‘state-descriptive’ respectively. According to 
Milsark, ‘properties are those facts about entities which are assumed to be, even if they 
are not in fact, permanent, unalterable, and in some sense possessed by the entity, while 
states are conditions which are, at least in principle, transitory’ (1979: 212). He proposes 
that in existential clauses, only state-descriptive adjectives can occur as final phrases with 
an ‘unambiguous cardinality word.’ In Milsarks’s interpretation, cardinality words, such 
as the indefinite article a/an and numerical expressions like two or fifty, contrast with 
quantifier words like e.g. the, each, most and two of the, fifty of the; where the former 
‘specify the size of the class involved, while [the latter] express quantification over (part 
of) the class under consideration’ (Breivik 1983b: 355). Thus, (4.59a) is unambiguously 
grammatical since a expresses cardinality. Some on the other hand, can be either cardinal 
or quantificational (Breivik 1983b: 355). A weakly stressed form of some (written ‘sm’), 
such as in (4.59b), gives a cardinal meaning; that is, it refers to a class of people, all of 
whom were sick. While (4.59b) is acceptable, (4.59c) is not. This is a quantificational 
71 
interpretation meaning that a selection of the people was sick, and as a consequence it is 
not permitted in a construction with there1 with a state-descriptive adjective. 
 
(4.59) a. There was a man sick. 
 b. There were sm people sick. 
 c. *There were some people sick. 
  (From Breivik 1983b: 357-358) 
 
The clauses in (4.55)-(4.58) can all be given a cardinal interpretation; since no man can 
be seen as specifying the size of a class of people (the fact that the size of the class is zero 
is less important). But this means that the state descriptive adjectives in (4.55)-(4.56) are 
grammatical, whereas the property adjectives in (4.57)-(4.58) are not. However, I would 
propose that no man has more or less the same properties as some, since a 
quantificational interpretation is not unreasonable either. No man can also refer to a part 
of the class of men. Although this sub-group contains no members, it can nevertheless be 
seen as quantification, making the clauses with property adjectives acceptable: Of all 
men, no men are e.g. wise enough to imagine such a woman as the one referred to in the 
lines following (4.58). The final phrases of the clauses in the corpus can thus be seen as 
operating under more or less the same constraints as in Present-day English. 
 
4.6 Absent there1 
Although the presence of the morpheme there1 was not regarded as necessary for the 
classification of a clause as existential, the vast majority of clauses in the corpus do 
contain there1. Only 37 clauses, or 5.7 %, of the clauses in the corpus do not contain 
there1. However, among these 37 clauses, 30 are of a type where there1 is absent despite 
the fact that it would normally be expected (see e.g. section 3.5.1.5 above). This feature is 
found both in main and in subordinate clauses, in prose and poetry texts. 
 
(4.60) Was nevere wight, sith that this world bigan, (MkT: 2111) 
 
(4.61) That is or was sith that the world bigan. (MancT: 120) 
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The existence of a zero (or Ø) realization of the there1 morpheme is supported by the fact 
that English (Middle English as well as Present-day English), unlike e.g. Spanish and 
Latin, requires an overt subject.8 As discussed in section 2.4.2 above, Middle English, 
like Present-day English, has an SVO word order, which requires the presence of an 
expressed subject in the clause. Despite the fact that examples like those cited above 
would be considered ungrammatical according to this restraint both in Present-day 
English and consequently also in Middle English (since they are both SVO languages), 
eight examples of the first type are found in Chaucer’s texts. Additionally, in most 
languages, the existence of ‘linguistic zeroes’, i.e. ‘the complete absence of linguistic 
material in a place where we normally expect to hear something’ (Labov 1995: 29) is by 
no means uncommon, and it is not unreasonable to consider the existence of a zero-
formal subject. This construction is further discussed in section 5.5.5 below. 
Of the 30 clauses that can be argued to have a ‘missing’ realization of there1, 
there is one that deserves special attention. As mentioned above (section 2.3), a crucial 
distinction between the locative adverbial there2 and the existential there1 is that the 
former contrasts with here, whereas the latter does not. This distinction is one of the most 
basic between the two uses of there in Present-day English. Consider the examples 
below:  
 
(4.62) a. I left the book there2.  
 b. I left the book here. 
 
(4.63) a. There1 is a book on the table. 
 b. *Here is a book on the table. 
 
Sentence (4.63b) is clearly ill-formed according to the grammar of Present-day English, 
since there is no ‘existential here’ which can function as grammatical subject in an 
existential clause. Nevertheless, we do find the following construction: 
 
(4.64) Here is a book and a pencil. 
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The grammaticality of (4.64) is due to the fact that this construction could (according to 
Lakoff) be classified either as a delivery deictic (1987: 522) or as a presentational deictic 
(1987: 520). The classification would depend on the circumstances. In most cases the 
delivery deictic would probably be the preferred classification, but a presentational 
function would be acceptable if the noun phrase was considered sufficiently significant, 
e.g. as in Here is a book and a pencil that used to belong to George Washington.  
However, in Chaucer’s texts, the following sentence occurs: 
 
(4.65) Here nys no peril, (Bo, I. Pr. 2: 18) 
 
This sentence clearly corresponds to Present-day English in the following way: 
 
(4.66) There is no peril here. 
   
The more canonical construction with there1 is also found in Chaucer: 
 
(4.67) Now woot I wel, ther is no peril inne. (Tr, II: 875)  
 
Another construction was also available, as illustrated below: 
 
(4.68) Nas nevere yet seyn thyng to ben preysed derre, (Tr, I: 174) 
 
If sentence (4.65) were of this type, one could hypothesize that it could have been 
formulated thus: ?Nys no peril here.9 The question is thus whether (4.65) is to be 
analyzed as containing an existential here1 or as having an initial locative adverbial and a 
zero there1. This construction is further discussed in section 5.5.6 below. 
 
4.7 Negation 
As mentioned above (section 2.6), Iyeiri (2001) has found that there is an especially close 
link between negation and existential clauses in Middle English. Table 4.8 below lists the 
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occurrence of negative existential clauses in relation to word order distribution in the 
corpus. 
 
Table 4.8: Negation and word order distribution 
Word order pattern N % 
STV 1 0.3 
SVT 10 2.8 
TVX 281 78.5 
VTX 47 13.1 
Misc. 19 5.3 
Total 358 100 
 
358 clauses or 54.8 % of the clauses in the corpus contain some negative particle. This is 
in correspondence with Iyeiri’s material, which shows that the use of negation in 
existential clauses ‘seems to be almost conventionalized, although not exactly to the 
extent of consistency’ (Iyeiri 2001: 119).10 Table 4.9 below presents the distribution of 
negative clauses between poetry and prose texts. 
 
Table 4.9: Negation and word order distribution in main and subordinate clauses 
Poetry Prose 
Main clause Sub clause Main clause Sub clause 
Word 
order 
pattern N % N % N % N % 
STV - - 1 0.3 - - - - 
SVT 6 1.7 4 1.1 - - - - 
TVX 81 22.6 118 33.0 48 13.4 34 9.5 
VTX 12 3.3 21 5.9 9 2.5 5 1.4 
Misc. 10 2.8 6 1.7 2 0.5 1 0.3 
Total 109 30.4 150 42.0 59 16.4 40 11.2 
 
Due to the low number of occurrences for some of the patterns, only the TVX and VTX 
patterns in this section have been tested for significance. The difference between poetry 
75 
and prose is significant in regard to TVX, but not in regard to VTX.11 However, the small 
size of the material means that the chi square test (which shows whether the pattern tested 
can be generalized to a larger population) is not entirely reliable. Nevertheless, a greater 
tendency for negative expressions to occur in poetry than in prose is also attested by 
Iyeiri (2001: 120), who notes that ‘[n]ever, no etc. are in usual cases less frequent in 
prose than in verse.’ A possible explanation for this could be that the figurative negation 
mostly found in poetry (Iyeiri 2001: 116) ensures that negated expressions are more 
frequent here than in prose.    
 Although not always statistically significant, the corpus data on negation point in 
the same general direction as Iyeiri’s material (which is also significantly larger). The 
interesting tendency of a correlation between negation and existential clauses will be 
given a metaphorical interpretation as part of the discussion on EXISTENCE in chapter 5, 
especially in sections 5.3 and 5.5.6. 
 
4.8 Other structures 
Below, I will briefly discuss a construction that does not have a direct equivalent in 
Present-day English. 
 
(4.69) Ther good thrift on that wise gentil herte! (Tr, III: 947)  
 
On page 526 in the source material, the explanatory footnote for (4.69) says that the 
meaning of this expression is ‘good luck to’ and that ther has not been translated. The 
status of this instance of there could either be interpreted as some kind of special there, as 
in the comforting expression there, there. Another possible interpretation, is that ther in 
(4.69) is an instance of there1 and that the clause is some kind of formulaic subjunctive 
with a non-realized be. If (4.69) is some kind of subjunctive construction with a verb that 
is non-realized for pragmatic reasons, this would remove the need for any special rule to 
be formulated. However, as this is the only construction of its type in the corpus, it is 
difficult to make any further clarification as to its status.12  
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4.9 Summary  
This chapter has focused on describing existential clauses in Middle English at the clause 
and phrase level. The analyses of the corpus data indicated that the most typical 
occurrences of there1 show similar characteristics to Present-day English there1, in terms 
of position in the clause, the verb phrase, the noun phrase and the final phrase. However, 
some clauses were found to behave non-canonically in that they contained verbs of a type 
not usually found in Present-day English existential constructions, or lacked the 
morpheme there1 where it would otherwise have been expected. These features, which 
would have been considered deviant in Present-day English, will form the basis for the 
discussion in chapter 5. 
 
 
                                                 
Notes 
 
1
 In the present thesis, the term ‘main clause’ is used as an umbrella term for matrix clauses and main 
clauses proper. 
 
2
 To check for significance, the chi square test was employed (threshold p<.05). With no occurrences of the 
STV and SVT patterns in the prose texts, these patterns obviously could not be tested for statistical 
significance. The difference is significant in the TVX and VTX patterns, but not in the Misc. pattern. 
However, since the chi square test is inappropriate (or at best unreliable) with five or fewer occurrences, the 
results for the Misc. pattern are questionable.  
TVX, p=.025 
VTX, p=.025 
Misc., p=1 
 
3
 Modals are dealt with separately, but instances of main verb use of e.g. shall and will are included. 
 
4
 This form of ‘begin’ appears as a catenative verb. 
 
5
 Examples of both shall and will used as independent main verbs are found. 
 
6
 The two linking verbs constitute the remaining 0.3%. See also table 4.3. 
 
7
 The difference is statistically significant, with p=.001.  
 
8
 Haiman (1974) makes a distinction between Type A and Type B languages, where the former type 
requires ‘overt subjects, including dummy subjects’, while the latter type does not (Heggelund 2002: 13). 
Present-day English and Middle English are thus both classified as Type A languages, while e.g. Latin, 
Spanish and Italian are Type B languages. 
 
9
 However, this would require an adverbial of time to be added. See sections 5.5.5 and 5.5.6. 
 
10
 As table 4.8 shows, over 50% of the clauses contain some negative element. However, the difference is 
not statistically significant, with p=1. 
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11
 However, the number of negative prose sub-clauses in the VTX pattern is only five, which means that the 
use of the chi square test is questionable, and that the results must consequently be treated with caution.   
TVX, p=.01  
VTX, p=.1 
 
12
 A third possibility is of course that the missing be is simply a copying mistake in the manuscript. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
INTERPRETING THE DATA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the present chapter, I will discuss the data from chapter 4 and attempt to interpret the 
material from a cognitive point of view, with reference to both syntactic and pragmatic 
properties. Section 5.2 is a short recapitulation of the corpus material, followed by section 
5.3 which briefly sums up some basic points concerning Cognitive Linguistics. Section 
5.4 recapitulates some of Lakoff’s work on there before section 5.5 discusses the status of 
the noncentral existential constructions in Middle English based on the corpus data. In 
section 5.6, some thoughts on the status of there1 in Middle English are presented, along 
with some possible implications of the discussion of the noncentral existential 
constructions.  
 
5.2 The corpus data 
As posited in chapter 4, most of the corpus material is not very dissimilar from Present-
day English in terms of distributional characteristics. Based on the corpus data, it appears 
that no substantial differences with impact on the interpretation of there1 can be detected 
in regard to word order patterns, the noun phrases of existential constructions or the final 
phrases. However, a number of features in Middle English which would not be allowed in 
Present-day English existential clauses have been identified, specifically in regard to the 
verb phrase and the presence or absence of there1. These features will be further 
discussed in detail in section 5.5 below. 
 
5.3 Cognitive Linguistics revisited 
As the title indicates, the purpose of the present chapter is to understand, i.e. assign 
meaning to, the data in the corpus. Although the theoretical framework chosen for this 
thesis was introduced in chapter 3, a brief summary of Cognitive Linguistics is 
nevertheless in order prior to the discussion of the corpus material.  
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The philosophy underlying this theory is that language is best understood in terms 
of our general cognitive abilities. The main focus of Cognitive Linguistics is that 
language (including grammar) is seen as symbolic, and that there is a continuum of 
lexicon and grammar, making grammatical structures heavily imbued with semantic 
content. In sections 3.2.1.2 and 2.3.4 above, such important concepts as ‘conceptual 
archetypes’ and ‘mental space’ were discussed. A conceptual archetype is a cognitive 
model which provides a coherent structure to language, based on certain prototypical 
features. A mental space is, according to Lakoff (1987:281), ‘a medium for 
conceptualization and thought.’ In a mental space we can conceptualize not only our 
immediate surroundings, but also fictional, hypothetical and abstract situations and 
concepts.  
Section 3.2.4 above discusses prototype effects, which are, according to Lakoff 
(1987), often found in language and constitutes the basis for the noncentral categories 
discussed below. In the present thesis, prototype effects are employed both descriptively 
and explanatorily. In other words, the corpus data are described in terms of radial 
prototype effects, but it is also attempted to explain the data by these effects. The 
explanatory force of prototype effects is discussed by Geeraerts (1999), who points to 
three main functions of prototype relations. First of all, it is ‘cognitively advantageous to 
lump as much information as possible into one’s conceptual categories [which enables] 
one to retrieve the most information with the least effort’ (1999: 97). Furthermore, 
prototype categories combine the function ‘structural stability with flexibility’ (1999: 97). 
This means that although the system can adapt to change, it does not have to change its 
overall structure every time circumstance change. This allows for a dynamic system, 
which at the same time preserves cognitive and communicative efficiency.  
Although prototype effects can explain the overall structure, the motivation for 
each category is, in the present thesis, mainly sought in metaphors (discussed in section 
3.2.3 above). As documented by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), metaphors structure our 
language, our thoughts and our actions. One such common metaphor often found in 
expressions connected with birth and death is EXISTENCE IS LOCATION HERE; 
NONEXISTENCE IS LOCATION AWAY (Lakoff 1987: 518). This is illustrated in (5.1) 
below: 
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(5.1) a. There’s a baby on the way. 
 b. We’ve lost him. 
  (From Lakoff 1987: 518) 
 
Implicit in the metaphor NONEXISTENCE LOCATION AWAY is the notion that 
NONEXISTENCE can actually be understood to be a location in itself. This is explicitly 
stated in the example below: 
 
(5.2) I’m in the middle of nowhere. 
 
In (5.2) a remote (i.e. distant, AWAY) location is expressed as NONEXISTENCE (nowhere). 
In other words, there1 can, under this interpretation, easily refer to both EXISTENCE and 
NONEXISTENCE, since both concepts are seen as structured in locative terms. There1 
simply points to a mental space, which can signify either EXISTENCE or NONEXISTENCE, 
depending on the circumstances. These concepts are conceived as different locations in a 
mental space referred to by there1. On this background, the subsequent sections will 
discuss the corpus material in relation to the noncentral existential constructions in 
Present-day and Middle English. 
 
5.4 The noncentral constructions in Present-day English  
As mentioned in section 2.3.4 above, Lakoff (1987) deals extensively with the noncentral 
constructions that he has identified; both the deictics and the existentials. The central 
point made by Lakoff is that there is neither a general deictic nor a general existential 
construction with several special cases (1987: 576). Instead, he proposes that the deictic 
and existential constructions are made up of radial categories that are ‘defined by a 
central member and conventionalized variations on it’ (1987: 577). In addition to a 
central deictic and a central existential which is based on the central deictic, he proposes 
the following noncentral categories (1987: 580-581), which are based on the central 
constructions.1 The deictic categories are: The perceptual deictic, the discourse deictic, 
the existence deictic, the activity start deictic, the delivery deictic, the paragon deictic, the 
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exasperation deictic, the enthusiastic beginning deictic, the narrative focus deictic and the 
presentational deictic. The existential categories are: The strange existential, the 
ontological existential, the infinitival existential and the presentational existential.  
This general pattern is the inspiration for the discussion of the corpus data that 
showed a considerable discrepancy from Present-day English. 
 
5.5 The noncentral existential constructions in Middle English 
In the following sections the findings in the corpus material will be interpreted in terms 
of the existence of a number of noncentral existential constructions. These noncentral 
categories are described in terms of both syntactic and semantic properties, and for each 
category a brief summary is attempted. This summary is inspired by Lakoff’s (1987) 
notation used for describing the various categories of there, but since the notation in the 
present thesis is considerably simplified, there is by no means a 1:1 relationship between 
Lakoff’s system of notation and the one used below. In the following sections under 
‘constituent parts’, (1) will simply designate the first element occurring in the 
construction, (2) the second,2 etc. The constructions discussed in this section are those 
that explicitly differ from Lakoff’s noncentral constructions. Although at least three of 
the noncentral constructions identified by Lakoff, of which the presentational existential 
is the most frequent (see section 4.3.4.1, examples (4.30) and (4.31)), are found in the 
corpus which the present thesis is based on, the description given above in sections 5.5 
and 2.3.4 are considered sufficient for the forms also found in Present-day English. For 
further details see Lakoff (1987). 
 
5.5.1 The location existential 
The occurrence of basic level location verbs with there1 is one of the interesting features 
in the material presented in chapter 4, as Lakoff predicts that this is not supposed to take 
place, due to the difference in nature between physical and mental space (Lakoff 1987: 
550). However, as the following examples attest, this construction was possible in Middle 
English. 
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(5.3) But ther sat oon, al list hire nought to teche, / That thoughte, ‘Best koud I yet ben 
his leche.’ (Tr, II: 1581-1582) 
 (Presented as (4.36) above) 
 
(5.4) Ther stood the temple of Mars, armypotente, (KT: 1982) 
 
The perhaps most straightforward way of analyzing this construction is in terms of 
metaphors dealing with existence. As Lakoff (1987: 518) points out when referring to the 
existence deictic, ‘[t]hings that exist exist in locations. To be is to be located.’ The 
metaphor EXISTENCE IS LOCATION could thus account for the use of locational verbs, 
although it requires some modification of the mental space that there1 refers to, so that it 
allows an entity located in it to e.g. sit down. However, as illustrated in section 5.5.2 
below, this is not unreasonable. Given that an entity is located, this location could very 
well imply a potential for action, such as e.g. sitting or lying down and staying there. In 
(5.4) there is no entity with potential for motion as such; however, I suspect that ‘the 
temple of Mars’ stands in the same sense that a tree stands. As pointed out by Gibbs and 
Colston (1995), the word stand is partly motivated by our physical experience of standing 
(cf. section 3.2.1.1 above), which, at the physical or bodily level, implies an activity 
(which can wear you out etc.) and thus has some characteristics in common with other 
activities such as motion. This can then be applied to inanimate buildings such as trees 
and buildings, even though they are not capable of motion as such. 
 
(5.5) The location existential 
 Based on: The central existential 
 About: Location in a mental space 
Metaphors involved: EXISTENCE IS LOCATION, LOCATION IS ACTIVITY 
 Number of examples: 5 
 Constituent parts:  
1: There1 
 2: Sit, stand or lie 
 3: A full noun phrase or a preposition 
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 4: An optional final phrase  
 
5.5.2 The motion existential 
Lakoff predicts that verbs of motion are ruled out of the central existential construction, 
but that they can occur in the noncentral presentational constructions. In section 4.3.4.1, 
however, a number of clauses were presented that do not fit either category.  
 
(5.6) Ne noon so grey goos goth ther in the lake (WBP: 269) 
 (Presented as (4.27) above) 
 
(5.7) Doun fro the castel comth ther many a wight / To gauren on this ship and on 
Custance. (MLT: 911-912) 
 (Presented as (4.28) above) 
 
Consequently, another category can be proposed, based on the assumption that mental 
spaces are indeed sufficiently similar to physical spaces that entities can move through 
them. The metaphorical justification for this construction is perhaps found in the notion 
of conceptual archetypes. As mentioned in the previous section, Lakoff says (1987: 518) 
that ‘[t]o be is to be located’, and it is not unreasonable to open up the possibility for the 
fact that an entity which is located in a space can move or be moved, as expressed in the 
conceptual archetypes of e.g. ‘the canonical event model’ and also, implicitly, in 
connection with it a canonical agent. In the examples above, an agent is presented, and 
agents, even abstract ones, can have certain properties like existence in some kind of 
space. This is found in Present-day English with expressions concerning e.g. time. 
Through the metaphor TIME IS A PERSON, the abstract concept TIME is assigned properties 
usually associated with persons. For instance, TIME heals wounds, stands still and goes 
(or flies, when e.g. a deadline is approaching). The agents in (5.6) and (5.7) can also be 
seen as having, at least prototypically, roughly similar capacities, thus being able to move 
or be moved in a mental space designated by there1. Verbs like come and go indicate that 
an agent that is located in a space and otherwise is capable of action; is capable of 
movement. The fact that the mental space (or rather: that specific property of mental 
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spaces) referred to by the motion existential is no longer operational in Present-day 
English is no reason why it could not occur in Middle English. 
  
(5.8) The motion existential 
 Based on: The central existential 
 About: Moving entities in a mental space 
Metaphors: AN ANIMATE ENTITY IS CAPABLE OF ACTIVITY, LOCATION IS 
POTENTIAL FOR MOTION 
 Number of examples: 21 
 Constituent parts: 
 1: There1 
 2: A verb of motion 
 3: A final phrase designating a destination or point of departure 
 
5.5.3 The unfolding activity existential 
The occurrence of existential clauses with there1 in combination with transitive verbs in 
the active voice suggests the existence of a noncentral category dealing with unfolding 
activities or events, since these verbs would not be expected to occur in the central 
existential (cf. section 4.3.3 above). 
 Lakoff proposes the existence of a noncentral delivery deictic which is based on 
the metaphor ACTIVITY IS MOTION with the metaphorical extension (via the SOURCE-
PATH-GOAL schema) ACTIVITY IS MOTION ALONG AN ACTIVITY PATH. A similar solution 
can perhaps explain the occurrence of the transitive verbs in the active voice. All the 
clauses with a transitive verb in the active voice describe some kind of activity, either 
physical or mental. (5.9) is an example of a physical activity, while (5.10) exemplifies a 
mental activity. 
 
(5.9) ther maketh no man himselven riche, (Mel: 1582) 
 (Presented as (4.18) above) 
 
(5.10) Ther wiste no wight that he was in dette (GP: 280) 
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However, not all cases are equally clear-cut. Consider the following examples: 
 
(5.11) Ther myghte asterte hym no pecunyal peyne. (FrT: 1314) 
 
(5.12) Ther may no man han parfite blisses two (MerT: 1638) 
 
In (5.11)-(5.12) the clauses do not express explicit activities. (5.11) is actually passive in 
meaning, but is best analyzed as active (and is thus a fuzzy case between this category 
and 5.5.4), and (5.12) deals with possession. One possible interpretation for this is that 
these clauses nevertheless express metaphorical activities. In (5.11), the verb asterte, 
which means ‘to escape’ or ‘slip away’, signals that some kind of process or activity is 
going on, even if no active participant is overtly signified. The same situation is found in 
e.g. (5.16) below, where the meaning is that ‘great courage is needed’, which entails that 
something or someone needs great courage. It can be argued that a state, such as being in 
need of something, is a process or activity (see section 5.5.4 below), which would 
connect it to the metaphor ACTIVITY IS MOTION ALONG AN ACTIVITY PATH. The case of 
han, i.e. ‘have,’ in (5.12) is also a special case since the semantic content refers to 
possession. However, Koch (1999: 285 ff) points out that to have in many languages has 
developed locative and existential meanings from its original possessive meaning. A 
close connection between the concepts POSSESSION, EXISTENCE and LOCATION makes it 
natural that a verb like have should appear in an existential construction (see also section 
4.3.5 above). 
The justification for the unfolding activity existential is thus possibly rooted in the 
ACTIVITY IS MOTION ALONG AN ACTIVITY PATH metaphor, which, since an activity with 
a source, a path and a goal must take place somewhere, needs to be located in a mental 
space designated by there1. It follows from this that one of the properties of this space is 
that activities may take place there, thus giving these constructions an implicit aspect of 
EXISTENCE. 
 
(5.13) The unfolding activity existential 
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 Based on: The central existential 
 About: An activity or process running its course 
Metaphors: ACTIVITY IS MOTION ALONG AN ACTIVITY PATH, ACTIVITY IS 
LOCATION 
 Number of examples: 41 
 Constituent parts: 
 1: There1 
 2: A transitive verb phrase in the active voice 
 3: A noun phrase, implicit or explicit, signifying an agent 
 4: A nominal constituent acting as object 
 
5.5.4 The action/process recipient existential 
The help/lack/need type constructions, illustrated in (5.14), (5.15) and (5.16) below, are 
also to be considered noncentral since they contain a transitive verb in the active voice, as 
mentioned in section 4.3.4.3 above, and exemplified below. I find it difficult to determine 
whether this constitutes a separate category or if it is a special case of the preceding 
category. However, since it has some special characteristics I have decided to deal with it 
separately.  
 
(5.14) Ther helpeth noght; al goth that ille weye. (KT: 3033) 
 (Presented as (4.39) above) 
 
(5.15) Ther lakketh no thyng to thyne outter yen (SNT: 498) 
 
(5.16) For certes, ther bihoveth greet corage agains Accidie, (ParT: 730) 
 
A possible explanation for this construction can be found by generalizing the examples 
above into abstractions, in order to try to identify the metaphors involved.  
As the label for this category suggests, all the examples in the corpus deal with 
some kind of action or process, with, typically, an overt agent, although sometimes only 
the patient is directly identified. Langacker’s notion of conceptual archetypes (section 
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3.2.1.2 above) provides a tool for analyzing these clauses. The canonical event model 
encompasses the notion of objects moving and affecting other objects, as well as the 
conceptual archetypes agent and patient (Langacker 1999: 24-25). It is possible then, to 
suggest that the canonical event model is the basis for the examples above. This is not 
unreasonable with a verb like help. However, to explain how a model with agents and 
patients justifies using verbs like lack and need, we must turn to metaphors. The 
canonical event model is based on objects being affected. This is expressed in the 
conceptual metaphor DIRECT MANIPULATION, which Lakoff and Johnson propose as ‘the 
prototype of causation’ (1980: 69). This prototype is then ‘elaborated by metaphor to 
yield a broad concept of CAUSATION which has many special cases’ (1980: 75). Some of 
these special cases are CREATION IS BIRTH and CAUSATION IS EMERGENCE. Based on the 
examples in my corpus, I would like to propose another special case, at least as far as 
Middle English is concerned, namely A STATE IS A PROCESS.3 All the verbs in the 
examples above, help, lack and need are verbs that denote some kind of state of mind or 
aspect of the existence of some entity. This state can be viewed metaphorically as 
CAUSATION, since a state is prototypically seen as caused by someone or something. And 
since someone or something has caused the state, then some kind of process must 
(metaphorically) be at the bottom of it, i.e. a DIRECT MANIPULATION, by an agent on a 
patient. Although the agent or patient do not have to be human, it is clear from the 
description of this concept that this is the prototypical case, since the concept is 
(probably) based on physical experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 70). 
This analysis is not unproblematic, however. Some of the criteria listed by Lakoff 
and Johnson are that the agent has a desire, a plan and control over the process, and the 
lack of which would make the clauses at best questionable instances of the CAUSATION 
concept (1980: 72). One way to get around this problem would be to assume that the state 
(e.g. hopelessness) could be a result of a plan and subsequent action (or lack of such) on 
the part of some abstract agent. There is no denying, however, that the above line of 
argumentation is not entirely convincing.  
The next problem is how this accounts for the use of there1. However, as Lakoff 
(1987: 542), Bolinger (1977: 93) and Breivik (1989: 33) all point out, the meaning of the 
existential there1 is to bring something into ‘awareness’, ‘before our eyes’ or ‘into a 
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mental space’. And as Bolinger (1977: 96) notes, ‘[t]he less vividly on stage an action is, 
the more necessary there becomes.’ Few things can be seen as less on-stage than an 
implied, abstract agent in a metaphorical process, which would account for the use of 
there1 to introduce these constructions.  
 
(5.17) The action/process recipient existential 
 Based on: The unfolding activity existential 
 About: A process involving an agent, a patient and state of existence 
 Metaphors: A STATE IS A PROCESS  
 Number of examples: 18 
 Constituent parts: 
 1: There1 
 2: A transitive verb with an unexpressed agent, denoting a state 
 3: A noun phrase 
 
5.5.5 The zero existential 
The absence of there1 in some of the clauses in the corpus material can be interpreted in a 
number of different ways which have an impact on the status of there1. One possibility is 
that there1 is optional in Middle English and as a consequence of this can be omitted. A 
second possibility is that there1 has two realizations in Middle English, the full there1 
form and a ‘zero’ form. The final possibility is that there1 is phonologically reduced and 
not articulated, but still is present as a grammatical form. The first possibility could be 
taken as an indication that there1 is semantically empty and inserted for syntactic reasons. 
If some special syntactic condition made there1 superfluous the morpheme could be 
dispensed with if it carried no meaning. However, as stated in section 1.2.2, the notion of 
‘meaningless’ words is avoided in Cognitive Linguistics (see also section 2.3.2 on 
Bolinger’s (1977) view). In the other two options, on the other hand, the zero form can 
contain some kind of meaning, even if the morpheme is not articulated, as the 
grammatical category of there1 is present, albeit in slightly different forms, depending on 
whether option two or three is chosen.  
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 The above argumentation is inspired by Labov’s (1995) treatment of the absence 
of the linking verb be in African American Vernacular English, where be is sometimes 
present and sometimes absent: 
 
(5.18) He fast in everything he do. 
 (From Labov 1995: 31) 
 
(5.19) About two is in jail, now. 
 (From Labov 1995: 32) 
 
Based on this, he suggests that the linking verb be (in the present tense) either can be 
omitted; or has ‘three alternate forms: is, ‘s, and zero’; or that ‘is may be present 
regularly in the grammar, just as in other dialects, but be reduced by the contraction rules 
of casual speech to ‘s and then zero’ (Labov: 1995: 34). Labov concludes that the ‘zero 
copula’ in African American English is a result of the last option; that is, the forms is and 
are can in certain environments be contracted and deleted. That this process is restricted 
to certain environments is illustrated in (5.20) below, which has both a full form and a 
zero form: 
 
(5.20) He my man, is he not? 
 (From Labov 1995: 41) 
 
The phonetic processes involved are, according to Labov (1995: 38), ‘something akin to 
the regular rule for the contraction of the auxiliary in English, which takes the full form is 
and converts it to ‘s.’ The following conditions (Labov 1995: 37-39) must be present for 
this process to occur:  
 
(5.21) The verb must be the first member of the verb phrase and end with / z / or / r /. 
This explains why is and are can be deleted, but not ‘m.   
 
(5.22) Only short, unstressed vowels, like /  /, can be reduced. 
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(5.23) The verb must begin with a vowel and must be a ‘weak word’, i.e. completely 
unstressed (which explains why the verb in the tag question in (5.20) above 
cannot be deleted, since it has at least secondary stress in the clause due to 
inversion). 
 
(5.24) The verb can only contain one consonant. 
 
If these criteria are compared to Middle English there1, it would seem that the possibility 
that the absence of this morpheme is simply the result of phonological reduction rules is 
worth some consideration. There1 satisfies a number of Labov’s requirements: In Present-
day English, it is unstressed, contains the short, unstressed vowel /  / and it ends with  
/ r /. However, there are also some conditions which are not met, specifically (5.23) and 
(5.24), since / ðr / contains two consonants, one of which is in initial position. In 
addition to this, condition (5.22) is not met, since Middle English there1, unlike its 
Present-day English equivalent, had a long, open front vowel and was (probably) 
pronounced / :r /.4 This does not, of course, rule out the possibility of some kind of 
assimilation process, similar to, but with different conditions than, the process described 
by Labov. Consider e.g. the following clause: 
 
(5.25) That at the feeste was that ilke day (WBT: 1076) 
 
A tentative transcription with there1 inserted before the verb would give the following 
result (only there1 and the phonemes immediately surrounding it are transcribed): 
 
(5.26) / …st:rwas… /     
 
It is possible to imagine that in this context assimilation could affect the /  / and / r / of 
there1. / t / is normally an alveolar stop, but can also approach a dental position. If the 
final vowel in feeste was elided, assimilation between the stop and the dental fricative  
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/  / could take place. In the case of / r /, which is a postalveolar approximant, the manner 
of articulation is close to the following consonant / w / which is a bilabial-velar 
approximant. As a consequence, a full assimilation (with deletion of the vowel when it 
ends up in word-final position) could occur. However, this explanation has some 
weaknesses. The first and most obvious of these is that Middle English used a trilled  
/ r /, and not the approximant of Present-day English. It is much more difficult to imagine 
assimilation between a trill and an approximant than between two approximants. 
Secondly, the phonetic environments in which the zero form occurs vary so much that it 
is difficult to come up with general conditions to cover all instances, or in fact, any of 
them, as (5.25) represents the closest to a plausible case. And finally, the phonological 
assimilation and deletion in everyday speech of the morpheme there1 is no explanation 
for its nonoccurrence in a written context. Consequently, it is legitimate to consider the 
existence of an alternative realization of there1, viz. a zero form, equivalent in function 
and meaning, but with a phonologically empty realization, and restricted to certain 
environments. 
 An interesting approach to the nonoccurrence of there1 can be found in Coopmans 
(1989), who discusses inversions in Present-day English triggered by a fronted locative 
adverbial of the type shown below: 
 
(5.27) Down the hill marched a column of ants. 
  
Writing within a generative framework, Coopmans argues that ‘whatever regularity there 
is to be found in the inversion constructions in [(5.27)] can be captured syntactically’ 
(1989: 729). Nevertheless, a study of this construction is interesting also from a 
Cognitive perspective. Coopmans takes the notion of semi-pro-drop, found in e.g. Dutch, 
which means that the subject position can be left empty if there is no need for an 
expressed subject. This is found e.g. in impersonal passives with an adverbial element in 
initial position (5.28) and in constructions with the Dutch equivalents of it and there 
(5.29) (Coopmans 1989: 733-734), as shown below: 
 
(5.28) a. Er werd gevoetbald. (There was played football.) 
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 b. Op straat werd gevoetbald. (On street was played football.) 
 
(5.29) a. Omdat duidelijk is dat hij ziek is. (Because clear is that he is ill) 
b. Vandaag werd duidelijk dat hij ziek was. (Today became clear that he ill 
was.) 
 (From Coopmans 1989: 734) 
 
Coopmans hypothesizes that ‘pro-drop in English manifests itself roughly in the 
environment that we observe for a language like Dutch’ (1989: 734); that is, when no 
overt subject is required and the sentence starts with a topicalized adverbial realized by a 
prepositional phrase expressing location, as illustrated in (5.28) above. Coopmans points 
out that ‘only PP adverbials which are somehow subcategorized by the verb can trigger 
inversion in English. This would rule out PPs expressing manner, instrument, reason, and 
time, and it would allow locative PPs that express direction or position’ (1989: 735), in 
other words, they act as adverbial complements.  
This approach, when applied to the missing there1 in Middle English, can give an 
indication of the behavior of this morpheme. As pointed out above, some clauses lack 
there1, but just as intriguing is the similarity between those zero there1 clauses and 
clauses with there1. Consider the following clauses: 
 
(5.30) a. In al this world of falsehede nis his peer, (CYT: 979) 
 b. In al this world ther nys a bettre knyght (Tr, II: 177)  
 
Adding to the complexity are constructions of the following type: 
 
(5.31) Was nevere brid gladder agayn the day, (CYT: 1342) 
 
An account of the occurrence and nonoccurrence of there1 must necessarily take all these 
constructions into consideration. At first glance, it would appear that the use of there1 is 
optional in cases where an adverbial of place is in front position, as in (5.30). Note that 
this is not dependent on the semantic content of the adverbial, as seen in (5.32). 
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(5.32) That in this tyme was or myghte be; (Tr, I: 1082) 
 
In this clause the adverbial obviously refers to time; however, the temporal meaning is 
expressed in terms of location. To be more precise, the concept of time is metaphorically 
expressed as a location through the use of the preposition in (cf. section 3.2.1.1 above). It 
can thus be seen as locational, and grouped with the clauses in (5.30). (5.31) on the other 
hand, has an adverbial of time, realized by the adverb never. This adverb, which literally 
means ‘not ever’ and thus is concerned with time only, is present in six out of a total of 
nine occurrences of this construction; the other three contain the adverbs thanne, sith and 
syn (i.e. then and  since).  
It would seem, then, that a plausible explanation of this phenomenon is that when 
a topicalized adverbial (of place) occurs in initial position, Middle English had a choice 
of using there1 or leaving it out. Coopmans proposes that there1 in Present-day English 
functions as ‘a true adverbial introducing a particular context for presentational focus’ 
(1989: 745). However, as seen from (5.28), Dutch allows an adverbial to take this role, 
and it is not unreasonable to assume that this could also have been possible in Middle 
English. This means that no special instance of there1 is needed for cases like (5.30a), 
perhaps making the nonoccurrence of there1 in these structures more of a stylistic choice 
than one of grammar, although this does not appear to be an entirely satisfactory 
explanation. Another possibility is discussed by Bolinger (1977). He notes that in 
Present-day English, in constructions with ‘presentatives without there, the stage is a link 
to what has gone before; it is in a sense topicalized. […] But if the presentative initiates a 
line of thought, there must be added’ (1977: 110). In fact, there does appear to be a 
tendency for this in the corpus material, with 18 out of 20 there-less clauses with 
topicalized adverbials referring to a previously introduced entity or situation. The 
noncentral zero there1 clauses (e.g. 5.31) on the other hand, appear to introduce a new 
line of thought in eight out of nine cases. This would seemingly provide a reason or 
motivation for the topicalization discussed by Coopmans, and can to a certain extent 
provide grounds for predicting the environments where the central existential there1 will 
be present or absent. 
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 This approach would also explain, at least to some degree, the variations found in 
the different versions of Cursor Mundi, which are more or less contemporary with 
Chaucer (presented as (2.16) above).  
 
(5.33) a.  Þat tim it was bot a langage 
‘At that time there was only one language’ (Cotton MS). 
b.  Þat time was bot an langage (Fairfax MS). 
c.  Þat tyme was Þer but o langage (Trinity MS). 
(From Breivik, 1989: 38) 
 
Although it does not give any clues as to the seemingly free variation between it and 
there1, the view presented above can be supported by the fact that in (5.33) there is an 
initial adverbial realized by a noun phrase, which, although the semantic reference is 
temporal, is metaphorically expressed in locative terms. However, it is not a clear-cut 
support to the view presented above, since the typical environment allowing the semi-
pro-drop is a fronted prepositional phrase, not a noun phrase like Þat time. However, 
Quirk et al. (1985: 1243) point out in regard to noun phrases that ‘premodification is to 
be interpreted […] in terms of postmodification and its greater explicitness.’ Thus, 
implicitly included in the examples in (5.33a) – (5.33c) is the relation below: 
 
(5.34) That is the time when there only existed one language.  
 
According to Quirk et al. (1985: 443), where, when and how function as ‘pro-forms for 
adjuncts’, i.e. as obligatory adverbials in the same way as prepositional phrases: 
 
(5.35) a. *He lived. 
 b. He lived in the 14th century. 
 c. I wonder when he lived. 
  (Based on Quirk et al. 1985: 443) 
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The adverbial noun phrase in (5.34) above could in other words be seen as being close to 
a prepositional phrase in function, in that both constructions often realize adverbial 
complements. Additionally, it could be argued that Þat time refers to TIME explicitly as 
an identifiable entity, and possibly in at least implicitly locative terms. Implied in the 
metaphors TIME IS A PERSON and TO BE LOCATED IN TIME IS TO BE LOCATED IN SPACE is 
also the opposite relation: If time is a person, it is located somewhere; and even though it 
could be argued that time is not explicitly personified in this case, it certainly is identified 
in terms of a discrete entity. And if time can be identified, then it is also located 
somewhere, since it could be argued that TO BE LOCATED IN SPACE IS TO BE LOCATED IN 
TIME. This could be the reason for the similarities between the (5.33b) and (5.33c) and 
the expressions with prepositional phrases. As predicted above, there is a choice between 
the full form and the zero form of there1 in this situation, depending on the context. 
 The above data could also be seen as strengthening the case for a locative 
interpretation of there1, since the morpheme can be substituted by an adverbial of place.5  
 (5.31), on the other hand, has no initial locative adverbial which can fill this role, 
and all occurrences have, without exception, an adverbial of time following the verb. 
Implied in this is that this is a different construction than the semi-pro-drop construction. 
The locative aspects of a zero-there1 could be the result of a need to locate the noun 
phrase in both time and space; that is to accurately identify the mental space in which the 
entity is located. The metaphors involved are, as far as I can determine, the same as in the 
location existential; that is, EXISTENCE IS LOCATION. To be located in time is to be 
located in space. The zero form is thus to be considered noncentral, whereas the example 
in (5.30a) would be a special case of the central existential construction where the 
morpheme there1 has been dropped in order to create a link to the prior context (cf. 
Bolinger 1977: 111). The number of clauses with a zero form proper as the term is used 
in the present thesis is thus lower than the number of existential clauses lacking there1. A 
zero realization of there1 would in cases like this serve the functional purpose of subject, 
as summarized below: 
 
(5.36) The zero existential 
 Based on: The central existential 
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About: Initiating a new line of thought in a temporal context. A phonological non 
realization of there1 
 Metaphors: EXISTENCE IS LOCATION, LOCATION IN TIME IS LOCATION IN SPACE 
 Number of examples: 9 
 Constituent parts: 
1: Ø-there1 
 2: be 
 3: An adverbial of time 
 
 However, as the renowned paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould has pointed out, 
‘[n]o scientific activity teeters more precariously on the precipice between bravery and 
foolishness than descriptions of unobserved objects justified only by their necessity in 
theory’ (1985: 438). Although this is written with natural science in mind, it is an 
appropriate caveat in linguistics as well, since the theoretical possibility that a zero form 
might exist is no reason for (nor an explanation of) its actual existence; an independent 
justification is required. The reason for having and using a non realized, or 
phonologically empty, form of there1 could be taken as an indication of Traugott’s notion 
of ‘pragmatic strengthening’ (1999: 188). Through subjectification, where speakers 
through pragmatic strengthening use old structures and assign new meaning to them in 
order to ‘externalize their subjective point of view’ (Traugott 1999: 189), the new 
meaning of there develops. A zero form suggests that the process of subjectification has 
entrenched the ‘existential’ meaning of there to a degree where its meaning is still 
expressed in a zero form. This can be combined with Lakoff’s notion of ‘ecological 
location’, characterized by redundancy (1987: 493), as well as Bolinger’s view that ‘with 
the there construction […] the existential meaning is more a function of the verb than of 
there’ (1977: 92). To Bolinger, the division of labor between there1 and the predicate in 
the communicative process thus differs somewhat from Lakoff’s view, although I 
interpret this as more a question of degree than of essence. In other words, given 
sufficient pragmatic strengthening and communicative redundancy (both through the 
motivations for there1 and through the verb; and perhaps the construction as a whole), it 
is possible to see the contours of a situation opening for the use of a zero-there1 form. 
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The view that these existential clauses lack any realization of there1 whatsoever would 
imply that they were completely void of the semantic and pragmatic contents of there1. A 
corollary of this could be that there1 is in fact completely empty; not only of semantic 
content, but also of what Breivik (1989: 33) calls ‘signal information’ (cf. section 2.3.3 
above).  
 There are in other words good reason to consider the existence of an alternative 
zero realization of there1, although it is open to discussion to what degree it is noncentral 
in the strict sense of the term, since the main difference between the zero and the central 
existential could be argued to be the non realization of the former. However, it has been 
discussed along with the noncentral categories, since there is at least some reason to 
assume that the form was not in free variation with there1, but restricted to certain 
constructions and carried at least a certain degree of additional locative implications. 
 
5.5.6 The deictic existential 
Perhaps the most speculative of all these noncentral categories is the deictic existential, 
which is based on one single clause: 
 
(5.37) Here nys no peril, (Bo, I. Pr. 2: 18) 
 (Presented as (4.65) above) 
 
Of course, one single clause in a corpus of 653 is not an overwhelming material on which 
to construct a hypothesis, but certain aspects make it worthwhile to at least consider the 
existence of this category. As mentioned in section 4.6 above, the question is whether to 
interpret this construction as having a locative adverbial in initial position, or if it can be 
interpreted as containing some kind of existential here1.   
At first glance, the idea of a fronted adverbial does not seem unreasonable. 
However, as pointed out in the preceding section, such fronted adverbials are typically 
realized by a prepositional phrase,6 not an adverb. Although this is somewhat speculative, 
it is possible that prepositional phrases are better suited for the topicalization required in 
this construction7 (cf. 5.5.5). If (5.37), in spite of this, is nevertheless interpreted as 
having a deictic here2 in initial position, the clause could be seen as a special case of the 
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zero existential. Or, possibly, (5.37) could be interpreted as a special case of the semi-
pro-drop discussed in section 5.5.5 above. None of these options are satisfactory since 
they would make the predictions for these constructions very complex. The zero 
existential would have to include constructions with both adverbs of time and place; and 
this would complicate matters, especially vis-à-vis the constructions with fronted locative 
adverbials. Or, possibly, the principles for locative inversion would have to include both 
adverbial complements (i.e. compulsory elements) realized by prepositional phrases, as 
well as other (optional) adverbials. As pointed out in section 4.6, (5.37) corresponds to 
the Present-day English clause (5.38a), a clause which is a perfectly acceptable without 
the adverbial as shown in (5.38b). This illustrates that no adverbial complement is 
required (which does not exclude the possibility of adding another optional adverbial of 
place as in (5.38c)). 
 
(5.38) a. There is no danger here. 
 b. There is no danger. 
 c. There is no danger in this place. 
 
In addition to this, the clause in (5.37) contains the verb to be, whereas Coopmans 
predicts that only ‘verbs of locomotion for which an unaccusative8 analysis is possible if 
they are combined with a locative adverbial’ (1989: 744) can trigger this kind of 
inversion. These are verbs like e.g. walk, run and fly. Thus, it seems that be is not a likely 
candidate as the main verb in this kind of clause. The sum of all this, is that it is difficult 
to see how the solutions discussed above could add to the understanding of the behavior 
of there1 in Middle English in any systematic way. Thus, in this situation it would 
simplify matters to have a separate, noncentral deictic existential category (i.e. a here1) 
that can function as subject. Despite the fact that one of the defining characteristics in 
Lakoff’s description of there1 is that it does not contrast with here (1987: 544), there are 
examples of the equivalent of here functioning as subject. In Swedish, we find the 
following synonymous constructions: 
 
(5.39) a. På kusten blåser det förskräckligt. (On the coast blows it terribly) 
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b. Här blåser förskräckligt på kusten. (Here blows terribly on the coast) 
  (From Falk 1993: 270) 
 
There is no implication in this that the Present-day Swedish construction in question is 
directly analogous to the Middle English clause in (5.37), but it is worth noticing that 
there are no inherent qualities in a morpheme that has the meaning of here which 
excludes it from subject position.9 There are also other indications that an existential 
here1 could be considered the subject of (5.37), and not merely a fronted adverbial. As 
mentioned in chapter 2, one of the arguments for the subjecthood of there1 is the fact that 
it can be raised (Lakoff 1987: 547). If we incorporate (5.37) into a sentence which opens 
the possibility for subject-raising, we get the following result: 
 
(5.40) It is believed that here nys no peril. 
 
 To test for subject-status, either the noun phrase or here can be raised. 
 
(5.41) a. No peril is believed here to be.   
b. Here is believed to be no peril. 
 
Without placing too much emphasis on this test, since it cannot be corroborated either by 
other corpus findings or by native speakers, it must be pointed out that (5.41b) sounds 
decidedly better than (5.41a), at least in Present-day English.  
To investigate the justifications for, and meaning of, this existential here1, a closer 
look at the metaphors involved might be in order. If the deictic existential is based on the 
location existential, then it would somehow be connected with the main metaphors in that 
construction, which are NONEXISTENCE IS LOCATION AWAY and NONEXISTENCE IS A 
PLACE. As pointed out in section 2.6 above, Horn (1989) categorizes NONEXISTENCE as a 
subcategory of DENIAL. (5.37) is an example of DENIAL, since the existence of peril is 
denied. Horn states that the denial does not have to be explicit in nature, ‘all that is 
required is that the positive proposition be somehow accessible as a good or natural 
guess’ (1989: 182).  In other words, for something to be denied, the possibility of 
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existence must, at least theoretically, be present. If something is to exist, it must exist 
somewhere, as stated in the metaphors EXISTENCE IS LOCATION and NONEXISTENCE IS 
LOCATION AWAY. This means that, as far as the metaphors are concerned, the negation 
entails some kind of existence. Since NONEXISTENCE IS LOCATION AWAY and 
EXISTENCE (i.e. any kind of existence, including nonexistence) IS LOCATION, then it is in 
fact possible to propose that, implicitly, NEGATION IS EXISTENCE. Any entity which is 
negated thus has some kind of existence at some kind of location, and, if NONEXISTENCE 
IS LOCATION AWAY, then EXISTENCE IS LOCATION HERE (cf. Lakoff 1987: 518).   
The meaning of the deictic existential would then be something along the lines of 
negating an entity by implicitly setting up its existence in an appropriate mental space 
signaling nonexistence. This existence in the remote nonexistence-location would 
consequently be implicitly designated by there1, which means that, logically, a location 
signaling existence could be overtly designated by here1. Or, to put it differently, if 
nonexistence is existence away (and the peril does not exist, because its existence is 
being explicitly denied), then the non-existing entity must be there, and if it is there then 
it cannot be here since it would not make any sense for it to be located in two different 
spaces, implying both existence and nonexistence at the same time. When here is thus 
‘freed’ to act as a subject referring to a mental space in this manner, its occurrence in a 
deictic existential construction is a little more plausible. However, it is implied in the 
above argumentation that here1 can only occur in a construction which contains a 
negative particle or negative adverb. The following clause in (5.42a) would not be 
expected given the metaphors involved in this construction. (5.42b), on the other hand, is 
acceptable since this is an example of the central existential there1. 
 
(5.42) a. *Here is danger in the myth of a quick and easy weight loss. 
 b. There is danger in the myth of a quick and easy weight loss.  
 
As long as there1 is the unmarked member of the pair (Lakoff 1987: 549), the deictic 
existential must be considered marginal due to the degree of markedness it represents. 
Even though it would be possible to set up a simple system where here signals existence 
and there signals nonexistence, this hardly seems to be the case, judged from the corpus 
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material. Consequently, it would be counterintuitive to use the marked member of the 
pair to signify general existence (in a mental space that does not signify nonexistence), 
which, for all practical purposes, must be considered the unmarked state for a given entity 
to be in.  
The argumentation above is based on the assumption that there1 in Middle 
English was structured by a coherent metaphorical system, in much the same way as 
Lakoff claims that Present-day English there1 is. This is not necessarily the case. Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980: 52-55) discuss the ‘partial nature of metaphorical structuring.’ They 
claim that some metaphors imply a more extensive system than what is actually found in 
the language. For instance, the metaphors THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS and A MOUNTAIN IS 
A PERSON are only used to produce a limited number of expressions based on selected 
parts of the metaphors, as shown below: 
 
(5.43) a. The theory is based on a solid empirical foundation. 
 b. ?All that remains is finishing the penthouse apartment of the theory. 
 
(5.44) a. They stood at the foot of the mountain, gazing at the summit. 
b. ?They had just passed the knee of the mountain and stopped for lunch on 
its lower thigh. 
 
Although theories have foundations and mountains have a foot,10 there are no 
corresponding theory-penthouse apartments or mountain-knees or thighs. According to 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 52), metaphors have a ‘used part’ and an ‘unused part,’ and 
they emphasize the importance of keeping these isolated cases separate from the more 
complex, coherent systems like e.g. ARGUMENT IS WAR (1980: 55). At the same time it is 
worth noticing that under some circumstances, the unused parts can be used to coin new 
expressions, especially in ‘imaginative language’ (1980: 53); which is why the (b)-
sentences above have been labeled with question marks, rather than asterisks. 
In light of this, it is interesting to consider the use of an existential here1 as an example of 
an unused part of the metaphor which has been employed to create an imaginative 
language. However, the differences are considerable between the metaphors in (5.43) and 
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(5.44) above and those involved in existential clauses. There1 is based on, or motivated 
by, there2 which has the contrast with here2 as one of its most important defining features. 
This means that even if an existential here1 were to be seen as nothing but a case of 
imaginative language, it would nevertheless still constitute a part or extension of a 
substantial metaphorical system structured in terms of this contrast.  
Alternatively, an approach based on conceptual metonymic change is possible. 
This does not necessarily rule out the metaphorical view on the rise of here1 presented 
above. Traugott (1999: 187) points out that ‘good metonymies are often metaphorical as 
well, so there is no difficulty in looking at [a] change either way.’   
Nevertheless, metonymy and metaphor are different processes, as stated by 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 36): ‘Metaphor is principally a way of conceiving one thing in 
terms of another, and its primary function is understanding. Metonymy, on the other 
hand, has primarily a referential function, that is, it allows us to use one entity to stand 
for another.’ This is of course also part of the process of understanding something, even 
though that is not the primary function of metonymy. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 38-39) 
identify a number of metonymic concepts, one of which is THE PLACE FOR THE EVENT, as 
in (5.45): 
 
(5.45) Let’s not let Thailand become another Vietnam.  
 (From Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 39) 
 
It could be that a similar concept, such as perhaps THE PLACE FOR THE CIRCUMSTANCES, 
is the cause of (5.37). This is based on a view of (5.37) where the subject here1 is seen as 
co-referential with the predicate nys no peril. The process whereby here1 comes to stand 
for nys no peril, could be approached through investigating what the syntactic 
constituents of (5.37) refer to. It is worth noticing that the clause in (5.37) can be 
rephrased in two distinct ways in Present-day English (‘theme’ and ‘rheme’ correspond to 
‘topic’ and ‘comment’, respectively (Breivik 1983a: 23)): 
 
(5.46) a. No dangerx is here. (x = thematic)  
 b. There is no dangerx here. (x = rhematic) 
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 c. There is no danger. 
 
(5.46a) corresponds to what Koch labels as thematic ‘bounded’ (i.e. limited in terms of 
time or space) existence, while (5.46b) can be classified as ‘rhematic bounded existence 
(Koch 1999: 282-283), as opposed to the ‘unbounded’ (5.46c). Koch says that bounded 
existence is a prototypical case of EXISTENCE, since all form of existence is bounded in 
some way, at the very least by ‘the universe of discourse’ (1999: 295). As a result of this, 
he claims that ‘[a] new expression for EXISTENCE in general is created with more than 
random probability by extension of meaning form an expression for BOUNDED 
EXISTENCE’ (Koch 1999: 296). This seems to be the case in (5.37), where the bounded 
existence similar to that expressed in e.g. a clause like (5.46b) is the cause of the 
existential here1 construction in (5.37) through a metonymic change. This change could 
be effected through a reinterpretation of the parts of the clause, as follows: The terms 
‘thematic’ and ‘rhematic’ can be interpreted as ‘figure’ and ‘ground’, respectively (cf. 
section 3.2.1.2). Since ‘figure’ is associated with ‘foreground’ and ‘ground’ with 
‘background’, it is natural to assign these properties to ‘theme’ and ‘rheme.’  If we assign 
properties to the subject and predicate based on this, we get the following result: 
 
Table 5.1:  The figure-ground organization of the deictic existential  
Feature: 
Linguistic unit: 
Thematicity 
(syntactically) 
Figure 
(logically) 
Foreground 
(semantically) 
Here + - + 
Nys no peril - + + 
 
Table 5.1 shows that the thematic position usually associated with ‘figure’, has the 
element here, which can logically be regarded as ‘ground’, given that it occurs in a 
position usually occupied by the there1, which functions to signify background in 
existential clauses (cf. the central existential). At the same time, the predicate, though 
being in rhematic (i.e. typically ground) position, is the logical figure of the construction. 
Both elements refer semantically to the foreground, as here signifies proximity (the 
opposite of there), while the situation or circumstance no peril must apply to some place, 
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and that place is here, i.e. the same location which is referred to by the foreground.  Thus, 
the subject and predicate can be seen as semantically co-referential, with here standing 
metonymically for nys no peril. In effect, the use of an existential here1 is to 
‘background’ the foreground, so that it can act as a background (or subject) in an 
existential construction, in the same way as there1 does. In other words, the meaning of 
here is pragmatically strengthened, thus ‘enriching […] the form-meaning pair in 
question with the speaker’s perspective’ (Traugott 1999: 188). The bounded existence of 
(5.46b) can in this way be seen as giving rise to a new existential construction.   
 The internal relationship between the possible metaphorical and metonymic 
processes described above is not easy to determine. Traugott notes that in a case of 
metonymic change, ‘a metaphorical interpretation is not ruled out at the earliest stage. On 
the metaphorical view, physical deeds come to be understood as mapped onto anything 
that is observable’ (1999: 187). However, the metonymic leap of interpreting here as 
standing for nys no peril is based on both entities being regarded as non-metaphorical.  
Even though the corpus material is scarce, it is thus not all that unreasonable to 
consider (5.37) above an example of a noncentral existential category, even though its 
status must remain uncertain. Below is a schematic summary of the above account of the 
existential here1. Note that no final phrase is needed, since the locative aspect which is 
typically the function of the final phrase in the central existential, is implied in the 
construction itself (both in the metaphorical and the metonymical approach). 
 
(5.47) The deictic existential 
Based on: The location existential  
About: Implicit existence through negation 
Metaphors: NONEXISTENCE IS EXISTENCE AWAY, EXISTENCE IS EXISTENCE HERE 
Number of examples: 1 
Constituent parts: 
1: Here1 
2: Negative particle + be 
3: A noun phrase 
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5.6 The status of existential there1 in Middle English 
The preceding sections have all dealt with the various noncentral categories found in the 
corpus material. However, in a discussion of the status of there1 in Middle English, it 
must be pointed out that the overwhelming majority of the clauses found are strikingly 
modern. Of the 653 clauses in the corpus, 563 or 86.2% contain an intransitive verb, of 
which 433 or 77.0% (i.e. 66.3% of the entire corpus) are instances of a simple verb 
phrase with the verb to be. Except for the orthographic conventions, a number of the 
clauses display striking similarities with clauses that could have been written today, at 
least as far as there1 is concerned.  
 An interesting aspect of the noncentral existential constructions discussed above 
is that they may provide some indications of what the differences between Present-day 
English and Middle English existential clauses were based on. The noncentral 
constructions (with the possible exception of the zero existential) all have in common that 
they assign other properties to the mental space referred to by there1 than do those 
existential constructions that exist today (cf. section 2.3.4 above). The Middle English 
noncentral constructions give a combined image of a mental space with a number of 
properties in common with the space referred to by there2, and especially by Lakoff’s 
noncentral existential deictic. Lakoff’s prediction number 7 (1987: 544) basically states 
that there1 cannot refer to locations, because the morpheme refers to a mental space. As 
the existence deictic illustrates, this is not really a universal proposition since this 
construction refers to an abstract space structured in locative terms, which means that 
nothing inherent in such a space precludes a locative understanding, especially not when 
faced with contradictory corpus data. Thus, it does appear that the continuum between 
there1 and there2 was structured differently in Middle English, and that the noncentral 
existentials could refer to mental spaces conceived of as having other properties than in 
Present-day English. This suggests that although there1 has a nominal function in Middle 
English, some of its noncentral variants are more closely connected with the place adverb 
there2 in terms of the mental space it refers to. It also supports the claim that there1 has 
developed from there2, as well as Lakoff’s proposition that there is no ‘generalized 
existential’ (1987: 575). Such a construction would be even more complicated with the 
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noncentral constructions listed above. However, a ‘based on’ model is able to include 
these noncentral cases, since all that needs to be specified is where they differ from the 
central existential. Below is an illustration of the proposed existential category system in 
Middle English: 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The radial category relations of Middle English there1 
 
This is of course an illustration of one possible interpretation, based on one theoretical 
approach, viz. that of Cognitive Linguistics and more specifically Lakoff’s. Coopmans 
for instance, has another interpretation, where there1 is seen as ‘a true adverbial 
introducing a particular context for presentational focus’ (1989: 745). The functional 
aspect is not altogether dissimilar from Lakoff’s view; however, Coopmans offers a 
purely syntactic analysis, which (as pointed out in section 2.3.4 above) is unable to cope 
with the wide range of existential constructions. In the present thesis, syntactic factors 
have been discussed and certainly play a part in the understanding of there1, however, it 
is posited that semantic and pragmatic factors must be included in the predictions for the 
construction in order to fully account for the corpus data. In this way, a cognitive 
approach is able to account for the various constructions in terms of radial category 
structure, based on metaphor and metonymy. The significance of cognitive entrenchment, 
Central deictic 
Central existential 
Zero 
existential 
Presentational 
existential 
Location 
existential 
Deictic 
existential 
Motion 
existential 
Unfolding 
activity 
existential 
Action/process 
recipient 
existential 
Infinitival 
existential 
Ontological 
existential 
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as proposed in section 3.4.5.2 above, proved more difficult to interpret, since the 
frequencies in the corpus material were very low.11 If anything, one could tentatively 
propose that the deictic existential shows least entrenchment, whereas the unfolding 
activity existential shows the most. This could be taken as an indication that the former 
was more well-motivated, i.e. had a better ecological location, than the former. However, 
the conclusions are uncertain, and consequently no attempt has been made to include this 
in the illustration above. Figure 5.1 shows the central existential as being based on the 
central deictic, as well as illustrating the various based-on relationships organizing the 
other categories. However, the nature of the corpus data has some effect on the process 
by which this radial structure has developed best can be understood. 
Traugott holds the view that ‘[i]f the meaning of a lexical item or morpheme is 
grounded in the socio-physical world of reference, it is likely that over time speakers will 
develop polysemies that are grounded in the speaker’s world, whether reasoning, belief, 
or metatextual attitude to the discourse’ (Traugott 1999: 179). A similar claim is made by 
Sweetser (1990: 50) who states that ‘creoles first develop their expression of root 
modality before going on to extend that expression fully to the epistemic domain.’ In 
other words, the ‘starting point’ of a morpheme is concrete, and then gradually, new and 
abstract meanings develop. However, as the present study illustrates, in the case of there1 
this is not a clear-cut and linear process. It would seem that the number of noncentral 
existential constructions was higher in Middle English than in Present-day English. This 
could, possibly, indicate a situation where the number of noncentral constructions was 
greatest in the early stages of English, i.e. shortly after the difference between there1 and 
there2 had been established. Then, as the cognitive efficiency of each category influenced 
the cognitive entrenchment, the number of noncentral constructions was whittled down to 
those operational in Present-day English. This argumentation is presented by Gould 
(1989) in regard to the evolutionary process, and although his viewpoints are 
controversial when it comes to the evolution of life forms, this does not mean that his 
way of thinking loses its potential power as a source of inspiration to other fields.12 
Interestingly, Bergen and Plauché (2005) in their study of French and English deictics 
and existentials, make use of another concept from biology, viz. that of convergence, 
which is a tendency for organisms facing similar challenges to develop similar responses 
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independently of each other. Bergen and Plauché (2005: 37) note that ‘[r]adial categories 
of constructions have a straightforward analog in the domain of biology. Understanding 
how this biological counterpart develops over time can afford us new ways to 
conceptualize how and why radial categories of constructions develop over time.’ 
Although Bergen and Plauché do not refer to Gould’s theories, they strengthen the 
argument for using biological theory as a model for linguistic theory.13  
Based on the interpretation of certain fossil findings in British Columbia, Gould 
proposes a pattern of ‘maximal initial proliferation’ (1989: 301), followed by a 
‘pronounced decimation.’ This is in sharp contrast to earlier views based on a continuous 
expansion, from a small number of simple life forms, to an ever greater number of more 
advanced forms. Gould’s proposal of ‘rapid initial diversification’ can be interpreted as 
‘early experimentation and later standardization’ (Gould 1989: 304). This is not all that 
different from the development of there1, where the number of noncentral constructions 
in Middle English was higher than in Present-day English. It is thus possible to suggest a 
process whereby a large number of noncentral constructions have developed relatively 
recently after the establishment of the ‘new’ linguistic device there1. This is illustrated in 
figure 5.2 below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Alternative centers of gravity in the diachronic development of there1 
(Based on Gould 1989: 303) 
Diversity Diversity 
Time 
Fig. A Fig. B 
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In figure 5.1, the view attributed to e.g. Traugott and Sweetser is represented in fig. B. 
Here the diachronic development starts with a small number of constructions which 
gradually develop a more abstract meaning, and grow in number and diversity as time 
passes. The ‘Christmas-tree’ shaped fig. A on the other hand, has its center of gravity at 
an early point in the history of there1 and represents a view of initial maximal 
proliferation, where the number of existential constructions rapidly increase, and then 
decline as some constructions through experience are found to be more efficient and thus 
easier to reproduce than others. According to Breivik (1983a: 136), there1 becomes ‘more 
and more common during the Old and Middle English periods,’ which, at the very least, 
does not contradict a hypothesis of early diversity. Intuitively, it seems natural that there 
is a period of trial and error in a wide range of environments as there1 becomes more 
widespread, in order to test the efficiency of the construction (which would involve some 
testing to find out where it does not work). This does not affect the basic view that there1 
has developed from there2 and attained a more abstract meaning through a process of 
grammaticalization; rather, it constitutes a nuance in regard to the diachronic 
development of there1.  
It seems likely that the degree of prototypicality has influenced the use and 
retrieval by the users, thus creating various degrees of cognitive entrenchment of the 
different categories. During a period of evolution, or trial and error, the number of 
categories is reduced to those identified by Lakoff in Present-day English. This analogy is 
useful as far as it goes, but it should not be stretched too far. Gould implies that 
coincidence is a main contributing factor in the evolutionary process (1989: 301), a 
viewpoint which has earned him some criticism. However, it would be unreasonable to 
propose that linguistic change is completely arbitrary, since, as Lakoff has pointed out 
(1987: 84), there is always a cultural aspect to these categories; and as the culture 
changes there will also be some impetus for a change in the category system.  
Nonetheless; it is difficult to take the corpus material in the present thesis as basis 
for a deterministic view, where some noncentral constructions were ‘doomed’ to 
extinction from the start. This is also Gould’s point, when he says that ‘[u]npredictability 
must rule if geological longevity depends upon the lucky side consequences of features 
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developed for other reasons’ (1989: 308). Blank (1999: 71) points to enhancement of 
‘communicative efficiency’ as the governing motivation for semantic change, with six 
broad categories of factors causing the change (1999: 71-80): A new concept causing the 
need for a new name; expressing abstract concepts in concrete terms via metaphors; 
sociocultural change; close conceptual relations coupled with contextual information 
(which appears to be close to Traugott’s notion of grammaticalization); attempts at 
reducing complexity and irregularity in the lexicon; and the need to express emotionally 
marked concepts.14 As far as there1 is concerned, the cognitive efficiency of the 
categories would probably have been determined by interaction between several of these 
cognitive and cultural factors. It would appear then, that the overall view which best 
explains the results from the corpus material seems to be that of a large number of early 
categories, of which a few have survived and acted as basis for possible additional 
development.  
 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter started with a brief summary of chapter 4, before recapitulating some main 
points of Cognitive Linguistics. The subsequent sections compared Lakoff’s noncentral 
categories of existential constructions in Present-day English to those of Middle English. 
The possible existence of a number of noncentral categories of existential there1 in 
Middle English was discussed; and, based on this, I argued that there was a closer link in 
Middle English than in Present-day English between some of these categories and the 
deictic there2, since there appear to be greater similarities in the mental spaces which 
both constructions refer to. The question of the implications this might have on the 
process through which there1 has evolved was also raised. 
 
 
                                                 
Notes 
 
1
 Or, in some cases, one of the other noncentral constructions. 
 
2
 The notation does not include inverted structures, as these are considered to be derived from a 
construction which is covered by the present notation. 
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3
 This is based on the examples in the corpus. In Present-day English it seems that the common metaphor 
for emotional states is locative, via a container metaphor, as in they are in love, she is in pain, etc.  
 
4
 In Middle English, the fricatives were mostly voiceless, except between vowels or in positions without 
stress (Davis 1987: xxxiv). Thus, the pronunciation of the initial fricative in there1 would presumably 
depend to a certain degree on the context. 
 
5
 It seems that the relationship between there1 and initial locative expressions is profound, as noted by 
Bolinger (1977: 100) and Lakoff (1987: 570). The presence of an initial locative adverbial is in many cases 
obligatory in Present-day English for the use of there1 to be grammatical. 
 
6
 All the examples given by Coopmans are prepositional phrases.   
 
7
 A prepositional phrase could be seen as giving more concrete information about a location than a simple 
adverb does. In the yard is a concrete location, while here2 and there2 require the listener to be aware in 
advance of which locations these adverbs refer to. This means that a prepositional phrase could be seen as 
carrying at least relatively more new information than the deictic adverbs.   
 
8
 According to Crystal (1992: 403), an unaccusative (also called ‘ergative’) verb is ‘an intransitive verb 
whose subject originates as an object, [e.g.] The vase broke (i.e. someone or something broke the vase).’ 
 
9
 The acceptability of (5.39b) may be connected to the verb involved, which implies some general 
background to a force of nature, similar to Bolinger’s interpretation of weather it (section 2.3.2). In that 
case, the grounds for accepting the construction would be somewhat different from those involved in 
(5.37), which simply suggests that different metaphorical processes may lead to similar results.  
 
10
 As Lakoff and Johnson point out, there is no such thing as ’the feet of the mountains,’ which strengthens 
the case for the partial nature of this metaphor.   
 
11
 However, the sum of all the occurrences of the various noncentral constructions is 95 or 14.5 % of the 
entire corpus. 
 
12
 See e.g. Swedish historian Peter Englund’s Tystnadens historia och andra essäer (Stockholm: 2003) for 
an interesting view on the applicability of both the ideas of Gould and those of his critic Simon Conway 
Morris in the field of history.   
 
13
 In the present thesis, the decision to employ biological theory as a model for diachronic linguistic 
development was arrived at independently from Bergen and Plauché. This can be seen as an example of 
convergence in itself, i.e. a similar response to similar challenges, and in my view only serves to strengthen 
the argument for this approach further. 
 
14
 An example of an emotionally marked concept is DEATH, which is expressed as EXISTENCE AWAY in She 
has left us. The taboo of death leads to the creation of a euphemism.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present study is an attempt to gain insight into the principles which govern the use of 
existential there1 in Middle English. With a basis in Cognitive Linguistics, this 
investigation has examined the use of there1 in 653 Middle English clauses, taken from 
the works of Geoffrey Chaucer.  
 Chapters 1, 2 and 3 provided the background for the thesis. The introduction in 
chapter 1 gave a brief overview of the field of study and the theoretical framework, as 
well as presenting two hypotheses. According to the first hypothesis, there was a 
qualitative difference in terms of usage of the morpheme there1 between Middle English 
and Present-day English. Hypothesis two predicts that the reason for this is that there is a 
closer link between Middle English existential there1 and the locative adverbial there2 
than between their Present-day English equivalents. Chapter 2 presented previous 
research on there1, as well as other relevant topics. Chapter 3 dealt with theory and 
method, and presented the theoretical framework in some detail, as well as discussing the 
methods used and certain problems connected with them. In connection with the 
discussion of method, an introduction to the criteria for analyzing the corpus material was 
given.  
 The main chapters of this study are chapters 4 and 5, where the results of the 
investigation were presented and discussed. Chapter 4 addressed the distributional 
characteristics of Middle English existential clauses, and showed that the majority of the 
clauses in the corpus display very similar characteristics to Present-day English 
existential constructions. However, the proportion of forms that must be considered 
noncentral is higher in Middle English than what is found in corpora based on Present-
day English. But although there are differences, the similarities are greater than the 
differences. For this reason, hypothesis one was only partially corroborated by the corpus 
material. 
 A number of noncentral constructions were identified in the corpus material. This 
revealed a number of constructions which would not only be scarce in Present-day 
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English, but which would not be expected to occur at all. With the exception of the 
existential here1 category, these noncentral features were all connected either with certain 
aspects of the verb phrase or the presence or absence of there1. 
 In chapter 5, the results from chapter 4 were discussed from the perspective of 
Cognitive Linguistics. It was shown that six distinct Middle English noncentral 
existential constructions could be identified and explained with a Cognitive approach. 
Since at least three of Lakoff’s noncentral constructions are also present, this brings the 
total number of noncentral existentials up to at least nine vs. four in Present-day English. 
The first part of the chapter gave a brief account of some of the main points from the 
previous chapters, before the various noncentral constructions were discussed, followed 
by a short description of the characteristics of each construction. Within the framework of 
Cognitive Linguistics, a number of theoretical variations were referred to, as well as the 
works of linguists working in other paradigms. However, these viewpoints were all 
interpreted within a frame of understanding based on Cognitive Linguistics. The last 
section in chapter 5 presented some thoughts on the status of there1 in Middle English, 
and it was posited that the status of the noncentral existential constructions in Middle 
English has possible implications both for the status of there1 and the perspectives and 
terms in which we can best understand the changes this morpheme has gone through. 
 Based on the interpretations of the noncentral existential constructions in the 
corpus and their tentative degree of cognitive entrenchment, it was suggested that the 
nature of the mental space that Middle English there1 refers to is somewhat different than 
that of Present-day English there1, as described by Lakoff (1987). It was argued that the 
mental space referred to by some of the noncentral Middle English there1 constructions 
had certain locative properties usually associated with there2 in Present-day English. 
Locative properties like deictic oppositions and movement were identified as aspects of 
the metaphorical properties of the noncentral existential constructions. Again, as with 
hypothesis one, this represents only a partial corroboration of hypothesis two, in the sense 
that some aspects of the noncentral existential constructions displayed a closer affiliation 
with there2, but no closer relation in general was established.  
 The question of the implications of this for the development of there1 was also 
raised. It was suggested that the material presented in this thesis is not consistent with a 
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view that the meanings associated with there1 have gradually evolved from a concrete, or 
root, meaning, which has then gradually become more complex and abstract, evolving 
into more epistemic uses of the morpheme. Instead, a ‘Christmas-tree’ shaped 
development is proposed, with a high number of early inventions based on the root 
meaning of there, followed by decimation and standardization based on those metaphors 
that over time proved more cognitively efficient. 
 An obvious problem connected with the results presented in this thesis is the 
small material. To make predictions regarding such a complex theme as there1 based on 
only 653 clauses from a single 14th century author could with justification be regarded as 
foolhardy; even if that author is Geoffrey Chaucer. However, as pointed out in chapter 1, 
there was a need to keep the size of the material within manageable limits of two 
semesters’ work, given that this is a master’s thesis. There is nevertheless no doubt that 
the study would have benefited from a greater diversity in material, both synchronically 
and diachronically. Another problem is that there are no native speakers of Middle 
English available to support the interpretations of the noncentral constructions. Although 
an approach to overcome this was sketched in chapter 3, it proved difficult to use the 
frequencies of occurrence for anything but tentative suggestions based on such a small 
material. A cognitive, semantic study of historical material will always balance 
precariously between science and guesswork, with the implications this has for the status 
of the conclusions that can be drawn from the material. However, with that said, 
historical linguistics can in my opinion contribute much to the field of linguistics both in 
general terms and in terms of methodology. As the present study has shown, there are 
ample possibilities for further research on the noncentral constructions in earlier English, 
both synchronically and diachronically, as well as on the methodological questions 
connected to a historical cognitive approach. 
Although it is based on current, mainstream linguistic theory, the present thesis is, 
to my knowledge, the first attempt to combine a cognitive and a quantitative approach in 
a historical study of there1. Nevertheless, in spite of some of its shortcomings and its 
experimental nature, this study has hopefully contributed something to the understanding 
of there1 in Middle English.  
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